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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses Manuel DeLanda’s realist emergentist ontology to indicate a
foundation for an ethics of open possibility and experimentation. DeLanda’s emergentist
ontology will be used as a bridge that links nature as a creative system to human life as
self-consciously creative. As an emergent goal of human life as such, personal
experimentation has an irreducibly ethical dimension. I will argue that John Russon’s
concept of mutual equal recognition or universality-as-sharedness best explicates the
ethical implications implied by but not explored in the work of DeLanda.
Chapter 1 is a general introduction and lays out the three competing views to
which this thesis is opposed and to which it offers an alternative. Chapter 2 explains the
meaning and implications of DeLanda’s conception of natural processes as creative,
suggesting that there are ethical implications for how we ought to live life if reality is as
DeLanda claims. These ethical implications are emergent properties of natural and social
organisation. Thus, Chapter 3 will look at a selection of material from other
contemporary thinkers on emergence, aiming to bring DeLanda’s conception into further
relief and explain its unique appropriateness for the ethical implications this thesis is
explicating. In Chapter 4, the ethical implications of DeLanda’s ontology will be made
fully explicit. I will demonstrate how Russon’s principle of mutual equal recognition is
an emergent property of human history and, as such, the social foundation for the ethics
of personal experimentation and open possibility implied by but not explicated in
DeLanda’s ontology.
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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The main ontological claim that this thesis defends is that science shows us
that material nature is creative, that its creative processes have identifiable recurrent
patterns, but also that these patterns do not limit creativity, but are that by which
creativity happens. Myriad forms of organic life employ the same metabolic
circuits; the great variety of meteorological phenomena that all emerge by
convection, and the diversity of topological structures of the earth by the slow
convective movements of its mantel. To think difference on the basis of these
patterns is not to reduce complexity to simplicity, it is to see the open ended
possibilities for creation and experimentation that basic natural processes and
patterns make possible. Without these patterns there would be nothing. These
patterns are not transcendent ideals. They are not gods or essences to be worshiped.
They are immanent to the stuff that is and the foundation for the emergent
properties that most interest me in this thesis.
However, my main concern is not ontological, but ethical. I want to show
how the creativity of nature is the basis for personal creativity. The reason why
invariant patterns ought not be treated as gods or essences is because worship is an
attitude that closes off possibilities, whereas I want to defend possibility and
experimentation as the highest ethical goal of human life. Hence, it is not a matter
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of worshipping or idealising fixed realities, it is a matter of nurturing the conditions
of novelty and experimentation. It is a matter of nurturing the patterns so as to
maximise the combinations of material out of which structures and creations that
have value emerge. It is not a matter of taking the patterns from physics, chemistry,
biology, and technology and applying them directly to the social realm, it is a
matter of seeing how the creativity of nature that these sciences disclose can free
our notions of society from fixed and static hierarchies that limit the creativity of
human life. A conception of nature as creative grounds a conception of society as
an incubator of creativity and an ethics of personal experimentation. Personal
creativity and freedom is not a fiction of the human imagination, it is made possible
by nature itself as an open ended system of material creativity.
However we must bear in mind that, as you move from relatively simple
matter-energy-information, to chemical, to organic, to biological, to social systems,
to creative thought the patterns are differentiated by qualitative differences. The
function of emergent properties is to explain the possibility of these qualitative
differences. The human social realm is qualitatively different from the others (and
they from it), because human beings are self-conscious; the patterns of social life
are in equal part the products of intentional activity, whereas nature is not an
intentional system. The most important emergent phenomena of social life are
meaning, value, and normativity. We cannot treat these or any other social
emergences as a physicalist would. Although they develop out of physical material
processes, their real nature cannot be reduced to matter. They must be
comprehended by objective observation so that any important regularities and

2

3
patterns immanent to them become clear; to see how they emerge from the more
basic patterns of natural life. But the goal is not reduction to material elements and
dynamics, but opening towards unexplored possibilities made possible by the
dynamics of natural and social life. To see the space of possibility we must
understand the objective frames within which it opens up. Objective understanding
of the parts allows us to see how they combine to create open systems like human
societies, within which we can play with possibility, experiment, and improve our
lives.
There is unique inherent value in all levels of reality, expressed as the
properties, capacities and tendencies that define each. The human social realm has
a particular inherent value because it is a set of material and symbolic relations that
enables each person to become a unique individual human capable of contributing
in novel and creative ways to the social wholes of which she is a part. This
uniquely human value emerges directly from physical elements and interactions,
but as nature teaches us insofar as it is emergent it is not reducible to the properties,
capacities and tendencies of the physical materials that compose it insofar as it has
those of its own. Social life makes possible, through its symbolic systems and
institutions, a realm of human thought and meaning which, while it must contend
with physical reality as a limiting frame, is capable of creatively altering its
environment and itself (to alter one is to alter both). This self-conscious creativity
of action makes it immediately apparent that we are dealing with a qualitatively
different set of phenomena and capacities than in the non-human realms of natural
elements and forces. It is not only more complex insofar as it is made up a material
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that is more highly organised, but also more valuable than raw nature, in so far as it
is uniquely capable of overcoming particular limitations on its creative activity by
understanding and transforming them.
The human social world emerges from the interaction of humans and that it
is “[e]mergent ... express[es] a degree of freedom from ... the causal forces that
govern the parts. This claim means that more highly organised systems have
greater latitude for different responses to different stimuli.”1 The creativity of the
complexity entailed in the interaction of the different elements of the periodic table
is impressive enough, but consider the interaction of different words, thoughts,
ideas, beliefs, feelings and commitments and the creativity there entailed. This
creativity creates and is created by the social realm, which creates value insofar as it
creates us as beings who value things. We care because we are social and we are
social because we care. If we care let’s take care, we do care, let’s take care.
Human beings and the social realm that sustains us are not separated by an absolute
ontological gulf from the more basic material process from which we have evolved.
The point is that social creativity develops out of natural creativity, but is more
valuable because it is self-consciously directed. The ethics of experimentation that
I will defend thus finds its depth grounded in nature as spontaneous creativity, but
requires a definite sort of social relationship—mutual equal recognition—to fully
develop.

1

Jeff Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s

University Press, 2012), 27.
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Contra Previous Realism and Materialism

While a definite form of social relationship is required by my ethics of
experimentation, it also requires a definite understanding of the natural world, from
which the social world develops. I have chosen to begin with Manuel DeLanda’s
ontology because it provides a credible conception of nature as spontaneous
creativity that avoids the problems of reductionism that hamper older forms of
materialism. His work covers a wide range of subjects, but it is unified by its realist
ontology. It is a realism because unlike some previous realism, it does not end up
with transcendent essences, seamless wholes or reified necessary (inevitable)
general categories to ‘explain’ and describe reality and its constituents.2
DeLanda’s realism is interesting and attractive to my ethical project because it tries
to rethink how we think and what we think about, by drawing from interesting and
important ways of observing, analysing, simulating, and experimenting with reality.
These ways of understanding reality are drawn from mathematics, science, social
science, the arts, and the humanities. DeLanda follows Deleuze in believing that
what these studies of reality show is that “...there are no... universals... nothing
transcendent, no Unity, subject (or object), Reason; there are only processes,
sometimes unifying, subjectifying, rationalising, but just processes all the same.”3
This conception of reality as creative process is important because world views or

2

Classic examples of these three would be Plato, Hegel, and Marx respectively.

3

Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990. 1990. Translation by Martin Joughin. (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1995), 145.
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ways of thinking that have made use of older sorts of transcendent types of
universals have supported, founded, or been indifferent to many disastrous lifestyles and social and political assemblages. By freeing our conception of nature
from static categories, and grounding our understanding of society in DeLanda’s
conception of nature as creative, we at the same time see our way past old forms of
oppressive and hierarchical practices towards a new ethics of mutual recognitions
of each other’s experiments in living.
DeLanda’s alternative conceives reality as populated by historically assembled
(emergent) wholes that are identified and explained by real historical processes. For
example, if we want to understand cities, we do not start with an abstract theory about the
‘City’ in general. Instead, we look at actual cities, perhaps finding patterns or
mechanisms that can be applied more generally to an actual population of studied cities.
Wholes, like cities, humans, and languages, are assemblages which emerge from
processes and are always in process. In other words, everything is to some degree
emergent, that is, has properties, capacities and tendencies that are not shared by the parts
whose interactions a whole emerges from and is sustained by. Assemblages (wholeparts) have no essences by reference to which their existence is explained and “[u]nlike
organic totalities, the parts of an assemblage do not form a seamless whole,” they are not
static and closed, they are open and fluid.4 DeLanda draws the foundations and
inspiration for this ontology from Deleuze, but DeLanda’s articulation “[uses] ... different
theoretical resources and lines of argument.”5 This indicates the robustness of the

4

DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society, 4

5

DeLanda, ISVP, 3.
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ontology.6 What is presented is a world of processes where nothing is closed, finished or
total, and nothing is explainable with reference to eternal essences or archetypes. So,
how do we explain the identifiable wholes there are?
DeLanda addresses this issue as follows:
Given that essences are typically postulated to explain the existence of individuals or of natural
kinds, eliminating them involves giving an alternative explanation, not reducing these individuals
and kinds to social conventions.7

From the above quotation it is clear that DeLanda, while rejecting reductionist
explanations of material processes, also wants to avoid the opposite extreme of a
relativistic social constructivism. By ‘social conventions’ he means reducing everything
to contingent language-games which run the risk of eliminating material reality as any
sort of constraint or frame on human action. He is also arguing against the use of
generalised or reified categories, specifically in the case of the social sciences where their
use obscures the real social agents and groupings that could be the object of study. It is
not that these general categories are not useful, they have helped grow our understanding
of reality, it is that now thanks to this grown (and still growing) understanding we can
continue to replace generality with concrete creative complexity (from which contingent
generalities may emerge).
On my reading, DeLanda’s ontology founds and is founded by a conception of
reality as creative complexity driven by difference. I make the link from his ‘general
ontology’ to the social realm through this conception of reality. Because the social realm
6

Multi-realisability is an important feature of what emerges from nonlinear systems; of solutions

to nonlinear problems. The ontology itself exhibits this important feature of the reality it argues for.
7

Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and Virtual philosophy (New York, NY: Continuum,

2002), 88. Hereafter ISVP.
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(and the thought realm that emerges from it) has real effect (manifestation) in the
physical realm—we change our natural environment through social activity—and it is
equally a reality with unique properties, capacities, and tendencies manifested as creative
complexity driven by difference, it is equally a material reality with all that entails and
does not entail.
While Deleuze is the genetic father of this ontology insofar as he brought its
important parts into interaction, DeLanda’s version will, for the most part, be treated as
the singular individual it is .8 Given the breadth and depth of DeLanda’s work, and its
growing influence across many fields, this focus is warranted. What I intend to draw out
of my reading of DeLanda’s ontology is that it can found an ethics of open
experimentation, by showing that creativity is a fundamental property of reality and
needs to be nurtured as such. This interpretation rests on the assumption that there is a
link between ontology, the social, and ethics. Broadly speaking, the links amount to the
reality that the choices we make, the ways we chose to live and the choices that are
available to us, entail views of reality which can be understood in more or less detailed
and concrete ways. So, understanding views of reality (ontology) is part of
understanding decision making and the decisions that are available to be made. Ontology
and ethics entail each other through humans being social beings who bring meaning to
reality, where reality is one that includes meaning and ideas as no more and no less real
parts of reality. An ontology that is capable of grasping the layered complexity of
8

Singular (singularity) for Deleuze/DeLanda refers to uniqueness, not that there is necessarily

only one; in Deleuze’s world everything is in populations. In this case, DeLanda’s ontology is a unique
member of a population of theories that have emerged from the interaction of certain ways of thinking
about the world. Ways that will be discussed in the next chapter.

8
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natural, social, and individual reality is important because it provides grounds for ethics
in real material processes. The possibility of an ethics of individual experimental
learning and living is rooted in society as a collective effort of experimental learning and
living, which in turn has emerged from nature as a set of unconscious material
experiments in organisation.

Emergent Ethics Contra Progressive Teleology

Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to uncover the way in which DeLanda’s
ontology has ethical significance, even though he himself may not explicitly articulate
what that significance is. The thesis thus addresses the question raised by Levi Bryant,
Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman in “Towards a Speculative Philosophy.”9 “A ...
serious issue … for realisms and materialisms is the question of whether they can provide
any grounds or guidelines for ethical and political action. Can they justify normative
ideals?”10 I will argue that DeLanda’s can because it provides a way of thinking that is
open to immanent normative ideals that need not be justified by reference to transcendent
ideals but ideals or goals that emerge from the socio-historical dimension of human lifeactivity. Essentially, DeLanda can provide a materialist/realist ontological grounding for
what Noonan would call life-grounded ethics or an ethics grounded in life-value.

9

Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, eds. “Towards a Speculative Philosophy.” The

Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne, Australia: re-press, 2011).
10

Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, Speculative Turn, 16.
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DeLanda’s ontology is suited for this because it is not a downwardly reductive
physicalism, nor an upwardly reductive essentialism.
Plato is a classic example of essentialism, but there is also what DeLanda calls
taxonomic essentialism, which is when general categories of classification are reified. He
traces this form of essentialism to Aristotle, for whom, at the scale of species, categories
of classification are necessary and eternal. For an example of downward reduction see
Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves, where, based on experiments that have reported
finding a lag of a few microseconds between unconscious neural activity and ‘conscious’
decision, he argues that what we think of as conscious human decision making is
reducible to previous neural activity in the brain. 11 However, as Deacon argued, raw
sense data is colored by previous knowledge and interpretations “that have an irreducible
social and symbolic content.”12 So, even if consciousness as decisions are initially ‘made’
unconsciously by the brain “consciousness itself cannot be removed from the complete
account of the complex of processes that results in decisions and actions because the
content to which the brain responds is not raw … but already symbolically processed and
mediated.”13 Essentially Dennett does not account for the decisions and actions previous
to the neural activity that is previous to the current decision.
Another downward reductionist is E. O. Wilson who asserts that “all tangible
phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on

11

Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolves (New York: Viking, 2003) 227-242.

12

Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 37. Terence Deacon, The Symbolic Species (New

York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1997)
13

Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 37.
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material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequence,
to the laws of physics.”14 However, as Noonan argues
holding to the two basic materialist commitments—the primacy of the natural universe, and a
rejection of ideal substances as causal determinants in natures development—does not entail
reductionism because reductionism cannot provide consistent and complete reductions of
meaningful human practices and values [like beauty and goodness] to the interactions of
meaningless fields of energy.15

While maintaining a commitment to the foundational physicality of material
reality DeLanda gives equal material reality to the human social realm and what emerges
from it. Everything at all scales maintains a degree of irreducibility, of independence
from its parts and from the wholes of which it is a part, but equally everything at all
scales maintains a degree of reducibility, of dependence on its parts and on the wholes of
which it is a part.
DeLanda himself, however, does not unpack the ethical implications of his
realism. In order to explicate what remains implicit in DeLanda, I will draw upon John
Russon’s concepts from Human Experience.16 The connection that I find between
DeLanda and Russon is that both understand goals as emergent from processes that are
not themselves goal directed. Russon complements DeLanda’s ontology insofar as he
concentrates explicitly on the social processes from which explicitly ethical goals
emerge. On my reading, then, Russon can be seen as providing the ethical conclusions
14

E. O. Wilson, Consiliance: The Unity of Knowledge (New York, NY: Random House, 1998),

15

Noonan, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, 21.

16

John Russon, Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life

291.

(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003). Russon’s empirical observation of human
experience is framed by continental European philosophy of the last 200 years, and Plato, see the
introduction to Human Experience.
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implied by but not developed by DeLanda’s understanding of nature as spontaneously
creative. I argue that because Russon offers a historical (dynamic-temporal) process to
explain the emergence (development and maintenance) of human identity and larger
social wholes, his conception of the good of human life completes DeLanda’s ontology
by supplying it with concepts to grasp the ethical level of human social reality.
This ethics is centered on an emergent telos and goal for human life, one that is
compatible with an ever-changing fluid reality, and an ever-changing fluid human agency
that is part of that reality. I use the term telos, even with its historical baggage—that of
being an imposed reified ideal end—because I want to distinguish conscious human goals
from those that, whether conscious or not, can be identified through observation, analysis,
and simulation of human populations. To a degree this is what social science, theory, and
philosophy tries to do, I merely encourage us to consider new insights, methods, and
tools and use them to be less general, reifying, and dogmatic in our observation, analysis,
and simulation of human populations. The fundamental goal of human life—
experimentation within a context of mutual recognition—emerges from the process of
human development qua human development, and not from any source outside of human
history altogether.
At the same time, DeLanda’s ontology helps us to see that the fact that this telos
is emergent from human history does not mean that it is somehow not materially real.
This telos is not only immanent to human development but immanent to the Universe as
creative process. We are a development within and of the universe. However, as much
as I want to extend this telos to the universe, I also want to extend reality beyond the
Universe, and that telos to reality. The Universe is just the largest whole we are aware

12
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we are part of. The Universe is not exhaustive of reality; reality is not ‘univocal’, that is,
in the sense of it not being a closed totality:
Not an analogy of organs or homology of structures but a univocity of material with variable
connections and positions (assemblages). Not organic function or structural function but machinic
functioning ... Univocity is also the thought of the multiple n assemblages into which the material
enters.”17

Reality is multiplicity, it includes the space created by human minds and groups of
minds, it is the assemblage of all the possibility spaces of all the possible
combinations/interactions of the matter-energy-information-thought that might be
regardless of how much of it we are able to recognise and so be recognised by. The
Universe is only all that is for us at a given time. ‘Reality’ includes not only that which
is, but also that which is not noticed and that which might be created. Reality is thus
effectively infinite in its potential for creativity and variation, and we are part of and
agents of this creative variation. When the human social realm and what emerges there is
given equal material reality, not by reducing it but by including it, the sheer infinite
multiplicity and creativity of reality, from leptons to ideas, is appreciated. One is not
reduced to the other, each is equally real as what each really is.
From my perspective, unlike physicalism, which is wholly and fundamentally
non-teleological with its meaningless physical world, DeLanda’s project is only nonteleological with reference to a specific type of teleology. It is opposed to the teleology
of necessary progress toward imposed necessary ideal ends—ends taken to be
transcendent, pre-existing, essential, and/or eternal. Such teleology and the ontologies
entailed are incompatible with a reality of ubiquitous creativity driven by ubiquitous

17

Deleuze, “The Interpretation of Utterances.” Two Regimes of Madness: Text and Interviews

1975-1995. 2006. Translation by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotexte, 2006) 93.
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difference. If a telos is to be compatible with DeLanda’s account of reality, it must
emerge from reality through real historical processes and not impose stasis on fluidity.
Teloi, like everything else, are emergent from a process that has a temporal dimension.
So, in other words, they are historical and contingent rather than metaphysically
necessary. ‘Not metaphysically necessary’ in this context means that a different goal
could have emerged, or not at all. It is the teleology of necessary progress toward
necessary (ahistorical) ends that is the problem, not ends, goals or teloi in themselves.
As I explain more fully the contingent teloi of our lives the links between
DeLanda’s and Russon’s approaches to emergence will become clear. I will demonstrate
that what Russon calls “the natural goal of our intersubjective life” and what I call an
emergent goal and telos, that is, the “human project of mutual, equal recognition”18 is a
coherent normative completion of DeLanda’s ontology. Russon is compatible as a
completion of DeLanda insofar as DeLanda can be used to support the emergent goal
drawn from Russon. I label the resulting philosophy neo-materialism. This is a label
DeLanda uses for his own philosophy on occasion. The neo is used to distinguish it from
previous materialisms that employed transcendent archetypes, like reified social classes
and historical stages that follow ‘necessary’ progressions by ‘necessary’ means, as in
calcified forms of ‘orthodox’ Marxism.

Learning Contra Arresting Development

18

Russon, Human Experience, 72.

14
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Neo-materialism “eliminates … [the] immutable world of transcendent
archetypes.”19 However well intentioned the aims behind the positing of those
archetypes, or general categories, may be or have been they distort both the nature of
historical development and human goals. Getting rid of transcendent essences is essential
to the construction of an ethics of experimentation because, “[w]hen you invoke
something transcendent you arrest movement ... instead of experimenting.”20
Transcendent ideas of this kind arrest development, learning, and growth. Once we have
eliminated the transcendent ideas, thought can focus upon actual populations of humans
behaving in particular ways, what they actually do, and what open spaces for novel forms
of activity there are. We proceed from a dynamic reality to possibility rather than a
stereotyped categorisation of reality to fixed hierarchies and settled ways of doing things.
However, I do not defend simple accumulation of experience through
experimentation. Rather, I defend genuine engagement with what one can and does
engage with. The good of life involves learning, growth, development, and selftranscendence, not simply random accumulation of experiences.21 By engaging
everything engaged in a reflective and critical way we can learn more and better deal
with what we engage with, whether that engagement be intentional or unintentional. By
having a sense of the resources available to us and the ways that matter-energyinformation-thought can be affected, we can respond to the situations in which we find
ourselves in ways that are novel, creative, and also instructive for others. The
19

DeLanda, ISVP, 88.

20

Deleuze, Negotiations, 146.

21

Self-transcendence is a term from Russon that will be fully articulated later, but essentially it

captures difference driven development, and so emergence.
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opportunities for such learning and creation are always instances where our bodies and
minds are connecting with different material process:
New [knowledge and new] skills, in short, increase one's capacities to affect and be affected, or to
put it differently, increase one's capacities to enter into novel assemblages, the assemblage that the
human body forms with a bicycle, a piece of solid ground and a gravitational field, for example.
Of course, the exercise of a new skill can soon become routine unless one continues to push the
learning process in new directions. In addition, while rigid habits may be enough to associate
linear causes and their constant effects, they are not enough to deal with nonlinear causes that
demand more adaptive, flexible skills.22

Everything, including one’s self, can be designed for redesign, or better, designed for
continuous redesign. Recycling becomes a ubiquitous process of continual upgrading:
cradle to cradle to cradle, as opposed to the currently prevalent cradle to dump. 23
The understanding of reality as open dynamic process lays the ground work for a
socio-cultural space-time in which we do what we do because we can and want to, for its
own sake, for exploration; where we are no longer alienated from each other and the rest
of what surrounds—though there will always be a degree of alienation insofar as there
will always be some things at some scale beyond our experience, as well as some
assholes with whom conflict is inevitable. Dissolving all alienation is another way of
framing the ever distant horizon toward which we can consciously develop—a spacetime that can support most humans living a rich life of critical self-transformation. We
have an infinite distance to go. Each life is an experiment to learn from.
In order to understand these ethical conclusions, however, we need to first
examine in detail the ontological foundations that support them. The next chapter will
add detail to DeLanda’s world view and so provide an ontological basis for the
22
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conception of social order that living a life of genuine experimentation and learning
requires.
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CHAPTER II
WORLD VIEW

Introduction

This chapter is going to take a conceptual journey through DeLanda’s ontology.
A large part will discuss what I take to be key concepts for understanding reality as
creative complexity driven by difference. The chapter will also discuss some of the
ways of thinking and ways of living founded on those ways of thinking that DeLanda and
Deleuze’s ideas and concepts are alternatives to. These alternative ways of thinking are
part of preparing us to think about an immanent pattern of human development that does
not limit but encourages the sustainable development of open ended diversity of lifeactivities. The chapter will be organised as a series of commentaries on the key terms of
DeLanda’s ontology.

Scale

The ground affords the animal a solid surface only because relative to the speed or temporal scale... of the
animal, the ground changes too slowly. At geological time scales this piece of solid ground would indeed
be much more fluid.24

This quotation introduces us to the importance of the concept of scale in
DeLanda’s world view. Central to the concept of scale is how the relationship between
parts and wholes is understood. One established position on part-whole relations is
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micro-reductionism. Examples of this are micro-economics, which reduces social wholes
(e.g. a nation-state, friend group or social justice movement) to “mere aggregates of many
rational decision makers”, and micro-sociology, which reduces social wholes to
aggregates of “many phenomenological experiences”.25 For DeLanda, this reductionism
eliminates complexity and so is inadequate to the nature of reality. In its place he puts
the idea of emergent properties.26
For DeLanda, micro-reductionism is blocked by the concept of emergent
properties. Emergent properties are properties of a whole that are not present in its
atomised parts. These properties are actualised as capacities that the parts on their own
would lack, as a human neural network has the capacity for conscious thought that no
neuron on its own has. These properties, like the wholes they uniquely identify, emerge
from and are sustained by the interaction of parts at scales below the whole.
Another established position regarding part-whole relations is macroreductionism. For macro-reductionists the whole totally determines its parts, or in other
terms (pace some Marxists), the superstructure completely determines the substructure.
For DeLanda:
Blocking macro-reductionism demands ... the concept of relations of exteriority between
parts. Unlike wholes in which "being part of this whole" is a defining characteristic of the
parts, that is, wholes in which the parts cannot subsist independently of the relations they
have with each other (relations of interiority) we need to conceive of emergent wholes in
which the parts retain a relative autonomy, so that they can be detached from one whole and
plugged into another one entering into new interactions.
25
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With [emergent properties and relations of exteriority] we can define social wholes,
like interpersonal networks or institutional organisations, that cannot be reduced to the
persons that compose them, and that ... do not reduce those persons to the whole, fusing them
into a totality in which their individuality is lost.27

The rejection of micro and macro reductionism leads to DeLanda’s ontology
being flat.
By ‘flat’ I mean that the entities that populate reality are not hierarchised
ontologically. Whether an entity is part or whole is relative to the scale being observed.
In any case, neither is any less singular or unique, neither is subordinate to the other. To
illustrate, consider a community (e.g. an ethnic community in a city) where we see that
the emergent property of density (the degree of connection between its members) and the
emergent “capacity to store reputations and enforce norms, are non-reducible ... [aspects]
of the community as a whole, but [also] that neither involves thinking of it as a seamless
totality in which the members’ personal identity is [solely] created by the community”.28
People can and do relate to other communities and the people in them, and by choice or
otherwise can and do join other communities, while communities themselves also have
properties that interact with members’ identities and the members as independent agents
make decisions and take actions that affect the identity of the community.
Another articulation of this idea is that wholes exist alongside their parts, that is,
that once a whole emerges it reacts back on its parts as a separate and equally individual
singularity. In A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History DeLanda calls the strong mutual
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interaction between individuals (part-wholes) feedback. 29 It is important to note that in
DeLanda’s “extended sense the term ‘individual’ has no preferential affinity for a
particular scale (persons or organisms) and refers to any entity that is singular and
unique”.30 As he says, there is no “ontological distinction between levels of existence
(such as genus, species, organism) here all entities must be thought of as existing at the
same ontological level differing only in scale”.31 That entities differ only in scale means
that the properties of a “whole are not transcendent (existing on a supplementary
dimension above its parts) but immanent” to its parts and their interactions. It also means
that wholes, such as “communities ... are as historically individuated as the persons that
compose them.”32 All individuals at all scales are equally contingent, they are all only
necessary and identifiable with reference to their history (their process of their
emergence) and they as they are as emergent from said process.

Contingency and Necessity

DeLanda’s concept of scale demonstrates how all realities are singularities that
interact with other singularities in definite processes. The emergent properties and
patterns that these interactions generate are unpredictable. Hence considerations of scale
lead us to considerations of the meaning of contingency and necessity in DeLanda’s
29
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ontology. We will explore this idea through an example drawn from individual lifehistory.
How our lives go can be seen to be contingent with reference to the ‘free’ choices
we make within the range offered by the reified ideals of reality conceived as static. For
instance, some believe it necessary that I be educated, get a job, pay my taxes and raise a
family. However, the specifics of that education, what job I get and consequently how
much tax I pay as well as the size of and how I raise my family (all within a relatively
narrow range of tolerance) are matters of contingency, that is, dependent on the ‘free’
choices ‘I’ make within static reality. 33 The reified ideal is pursued as necessary and the
real is what happens by chance or choice in pursuit of the ideal. What happens, the real,
is subordinate to the ideal. In actuality, I argue following DeLanda, the ideals or goals
that we have are immanent to and emerge from the life we actually live and as such are
contingent. There is very little, if anything, that is necessary anymore than insofar as it
has happened. Necessity is what is real as the result of what has happened, not as having
been programmed by an ideal. Nor is necessity to be conflated with probability founded
on experience, no matter how likely.
Like the path that water cuts on its way to the ocean, the path of human
development is contingent and only necessary after the fact, and then not permanently so.
In the case of water, given the specific mixture of rock and soil over which it must flow,
the intensity and volume of its flow, meteorological influences, and geological events, the
path that it takes is the only path it could have taken; the path it did take given reality.
All that is necessary is what has happened, and only insofar as it has happened.
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Human beings across recorded history have always found, and continue to find
regularities that become part of our collection of predictables. These regularities or
stabilities, however, are only such relative to the range of spatio-temporal scales we
manage to experience. In other words, at some scale they are contingent.
How we view necessity and contingency thus depends upon the scale at which we
examine things. One can begin at the ‘top’ with a whole, break it into its parts, and try to
make those parts add up to the whole, or one can begin at a ‘lower’ level with the
interaction of parts and look at how a whole emerges from those interactions. What
looks contingent when we look at things from below can appear necessary when we look
at things from above. Hence the next crucial concept is bottom-up and top-down
methodologies.

Bottom-up and Top-down

Bottom-up synthesis allows us to see how things emerge; it allows us to see the
feedback between things that catalyses development (emergence). The components
distinguished and enumerated by top-down analysis can be used to run synthetic bottomup simulations, which are the only way we can adequately try to understand reality and
its complexity. The goal is not just to describe regularities, but to explain their
emergence and so have a more detailed understanding. Think of the degree of detail,
complexity, in current Solar System models that provide us predictions through running
as computer simulations. Compare that to earlier models/simulations of the Solar System
as concentric circles or wandering gods. As DeLanda says:
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…emergent (or "synergistic") properties belong to the interactions between parts, so it follows that a topdown analytical approach that begins with the whole and dissects it into its constituent parts (an ecosystem
into species, a society into institutions), is bound to miss precisely those properties. In other words,
analysing a whole into parts and then attempting to model it by adding up the components will fail to
capture any property that emerged from complex interactions, since the effect of the latter may be
multiplicative (e.g., mutual enhancement) and not just additive. Of course, analytical tools cannot simply be
dismissed due to this inherent limitation. Rather, a top-down approach to the study of complex entities
34
needs to be complemented with a bottom-up approach: analysis needs to go hand in hand with synthesis.

A bottom-up approach begins with the constituent (smaller spatio-temporal scale)
components of the object of study and proceeds up to the object. In ecology we now look
at complex interacting populations, rather than relatively simple food chains or
hierarchies. If a city is to be studied one would begin with a selection of parts considered
important (humans, animals, buildings, infrastructure, businesses, institutions,
organisations, communities), assess their degrees of freedom (what they can do), examine
the feedback between them and see how the social and physical entity ‘city’ emerges
from and is sustained by that feedback. We could then continue up and look at the
feedback between the city and other cities and between cities and larger entities of which
they are parts e.g., nation-states. A bottom-up approach
preserves ‘methodological individualism’ (appropriate to a bottom-up perspective) but rejects the idea that
individuals make decision solely according to self-interested (maximising) calculations, and instead models
individuals as rule followers subject to different types of normative and institutional constraints that apply
collectively.35

A bottom-up approach also
Reject[s] the methodological holism of sociology but preserves what we may call its ‘ontological holism,’
that is the idea that even though collective institutions emerge out of the interactions among individuals,
once they have formed they take on ‘a life of their own’ (i.e., they are not just reified entities) and affect
individual action in many different ways.36
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Real historical processes, like those that build and erode mountains and those that
discourage and encourage human development, can, to a greater and greater extent, be
observed using the complex bottom-up simulations that have been made possible by
computers. Classic analytical tools (linear equations, for example) do not work for
nonlinear problems. However, bottom-up computer simulations do.37
A top-down linear approach begins with a postulated ideal, something reified or
static, enumerates the components that precede the ideal, and then compares something
real to the ideal and its list of parts, finding that something’s degree of deviance. This
type of approach is “always carried out with reference to something that’s supposed to be
missing.”38 On the other hand, a bottom-up approach would, for instance, begin with the
components of an actual essay, look at how they interact, and see if and how a whole
essay emerges from those interactions. In this way it becomes clear how what emerges
does so, but in a way that remains open to other interpretations.
Arguably, everything we do entails an ideal or goal, or is driven by one. The
problem emerges when people do not recognise that goals, like everything else, emerged
from a contingent historical process. There are no goals, ends or imperatives that are
necessary in the ‘natural’ or ‘divine’ sense, that is, that transcend or pre-exist history, as
was generally thought to be necessary in classical metaphysics. We can always reassess
and alter our goals, as well as our necessary presuppositions, like the presupposition that
37
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language is everything or the presupposition of a material reality. Effectively, everything
is always already a process, and “processes are becomings, and aren’t to be judged by
some final result but by the way they precede and their power to continue...”39 All we
can really know about real things is the real interactions (processes) from which the
unique properties, capacities, and tendencies that identify things emerge. To understand
things we need to look at the nonlinear dynamics that create and sustain them.

Nonlinear

As we have seen, according to DeLanda, reality is flows of matter-energyinformation from which entities, existing at varying spatio-temporal scales, emerge as the
products of concrete historical processes: reality is fluid, creative, and nonlinear. As he
writes:
In a very real sense, reality is ... matter-energy undergoing phase transitions of various kinds, with each
new layer of accumulated "stuff" simply enriching the reservoir of nonlinear dynamics and nonlinear
combinatorics available for the generation of novel structures and processes. Rocks and winds, germs and
words, are all different manifestations of this dynamic material reality, or, in other words, they all represent
the different ways in which this ... matter-energy[-information] expresses itself.40

This is not reductive because the human social realm of which words, thoughts, and ideas
are an equally real part is simply one of the ways material reality expresses itself. With
this in mind we can distinguish between linear and nonlinear historical accounts.
An historical account is linear when it sees history as a progression toward an
ideal end, be that end in the present, the past or the future, be it the end of history, be it
still progressing or be it regressing. In a linear account of history, the end (the ideal
39
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telos) is taken as the starting point, consequently what has come before is seen as inferior
stages progressing toward that end, or regressing from it, as the case may be. Some
might want to think of the movement of ‘spirit toward the absolute’ or ‘society toward
communism’, or some religious population toward some ideal time/place. Progress (or
regress) can only be conceived with reference to an ideal. This is a problem when that
ideal is imposed as necessary/pre-existing/transcendent/eternal because in so being it is
not true to reality.
For linearity, what succeeds is seen to leave behind and be unaffected by what has
been succeeded. Some humans tend to see what is ‘new’ or ‘now’ as inherently better
than what has come before. Whether they are conscious of it or not this belief is because
‘now’ is closer to their ‘ideal end’, or in other words, conscious of it or not, these humans
structure and judge their reality according to an ahistorical ideal, for instance, the
freedom fighters who crashed aeroplanes on September 11th 2001. Or someone who
believes that ‘negative’ traits can be attributed to groups of people based on bodily
pigmentation, proportion and configuration.
In 1000yrs DeLanda gives us an account of history where there is no ideal telos,
and development is animated by feedback. DeLanda:
…far from advancing in stages of increased perfection … successive emergences [are]… mere
accumulations of different types of materials, accumulations in which each successive layer does not form
a new world closed in on itself but, on the contrary, results in coexistences and interactions of different
kinds… each new layer of accumulated “stuff” simply enrich[ing] the reservoir of nonlinear dynamics and
nonlinear combinatorics available for the generation of novel structures and processes.41 …each new
human phase simply add[s] itself to the other ones, coexisting and interacting with them without leaving
them in the past.42
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As an example of development through feedback, we can think of the way philosophical
concepts are used in the works of individual philosophers, how they incorporate each
other, interact with each other, distinguish themselves from each other again and again
and in different ways through the work of other philosophers, unique conceptions
emerging from the mix. Some of these others are seen by some to surpass what came
before. But these works are then taken back by others to interact with their priors. We
continue to read Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. The history of philosophy can
be viewed as a field of interacting ideas. Its story is one of the influences of these ideas,
their interaction, and what emerged there from. Philosophy’s history is not the story of
ideas surpassing each other, it is the story of a growing field of interacting ideas.
DeLanda’s thousand year history of the west is such a history. It tells the story of
how matter-energy-information-thought has flowed and stabilised in real spaces over real
durations of time. It neither merely describes what there has been nor deduces it as
necessary from some transcendent ideal (or one being pursued by a great human); it tries
to explain how things happen and what spaces for further activity there might be. Here is
an example of DeLanda's nonlinear history:
Cities began to change under the influence of these new nodes. New York and Chicago in
particular experienced an intense electrification and metallisation, which resulted in the birth of
the skyscraper, an original urban form unique to the United States, prior to World War II. The iron
frame, which allowed masonry walls to be replaced with glass, had been pioneered in European
cities such as London and Paris. But it was in America that this metallic endoskeleton evolved
into the skyscraper. Electric motors in turn allowed elevators to transport people vertically
through these huge towers. Chicago pioneered the use of steel and electricity in the construction
industry, catalyzed by the great fire of 1871, which destroyed the city’s commercial center literally
cleared the way for innovative building techniques to be applied. By the 1890s, Chicago was the
world capital of the skyscraper, with New York a close second. But its electricity and steel acted
as centripetal forces, making possible the intense human and machine concentrations represented
by the new megacities, the internal combustion engine and the automobile had a centrifugal effect,
allowing people to move out of central cities into rapidly growing suburban areas.43
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DeLanda describes some of what there is and how it came to be, how it had affect and
was affected once actualised, without any reference to an ideal, a purpose, or a final
cause, just difference, process, and change, material flows of humans, electricity, and
metal. Nonlinear history does not see progress but does see “strong mutual interactions
(or feedback)…between components.”44 DeLanda is promoting real historical processes
over ideal historical progress. Each of the aspects of the social/geophysical structures
described in the above quotation developed contingently, and each upon emerging
interacted with what was already here, in all cases preparing the way for new
developments; new coherent structures without a transcendent telos; in many ways
without intentional human design, at least without a grand pre-existing plan, just a
contingent assemblage of knowledge, matter, skills, and space.
In the introduction to 1000yrs DeLanda offers the ‘classical’ (pre-nonlinear)
theories of Thermodynamics and Evolution as examples of linearity in science. He does
this to illustrate the way of thinking whose prioritisation is a problem. The ‘classical’
theories admitted only one possible historical outcome; “optimal design or optimal
distribution of energy represented an end of history for these theories.”45 However, in the
case of biology,
As [it] begins to include … nonlinear dynamical phenomena in its models—for example the mutual
stimulation involved in the case of evolutionary “arms races” between predator and prey—the notion of a
fittest design loses its meaning.46

So without historically necessary outcomes how do we think about reality, about how it
moves, and how it changes? DeLanda highlights three ways of thinking, or explanatory
44
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strategies. 1. From, among others, chemistry and contemporary thermodynamics
DeLanda draws intensive thinking (gradients /productive difference/dynamic tension
animating processes, and bifurcation). 47 In general terms, intensive thinking is thinking
about things being animated by differences, like the difference between hot and cold air
animating convection currents. It also gives us bifurcation, which essentially captures
that at critical thresholds matter-energy-information-thought can abruptly jump from one
relatively stable state to another, for instance, water to ice. These thresholds, or better,
what emerges from the process of emerging from crossing one of these thresholds are
infinitely sensitive to the conditions at a critical point in the crossing. Infinitesimal
differences in conditions can have a large impact on outcomes, making perfect prediction
effectively impossible. The concept of bifurcation further weakens the idea that we can
say anything necessarily about the future, though we can with ever more detailed and
complex simulations make very probable claims (barring a bifurcation).
2. In addition to intensive thinking he takes the idea of population thinking from
evolutionary biology and mathematics. Population thinking entails the idea of adaptive
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change through the sorting of variably replicating populations, which entails the idea that
everything at all scales exists in populations.
3. From topology he takes ‘topological thinking’ which entails non-metric (so
beyond our direct experience) spaces of possibility where we can view immanent patterns
of becoming. These spaces have as many dimensions as the things being studied have
important degrees of freedom. From here we also get the idea that things can be grouped
in highly variable populations based on invariance over a specific range of
transformations.
John Protevi summarises the key ideas discussed thus far very clearly:
All of ... [this] depends on accepting the strong case put forth [by DeLanda] in ISVP that
Deleuze's project in Difference and Repetition 48 and The Logic of Sense49 - continued in the
collaborative works with Guattari - establishes the ontology of a world able to yield the results
forthcoming in complexity theory. ... complexity theory models material systems using the
techniques of nonlinear dynamics, which, by means of showing the topological features of
manifolds (the distribution of 'singularities') affecting a series of trajectories in a phase space,
reveals the patterns (shown by 'attractors' in the models), thresholds ('bifurcators' in the models),
and the necessary intensity of triggers (events that move systems to a threshold activating a
pattern) of these systems. By showing the spontaneous appearance of indicators of patterns and
thresholds in the models of the behaviour of complex systems, complexity theory enables us to
think material systems in terms of their powers of immanent self-organisation.
There are four main benefits here. (1) The first is the critique of hylomorphism, that is,
the notion that matter is chaotic or passive and so in need of rescue (by means of the laws of God,
or a transcendental subject, or the scientific project) to provide it with order or novelty. (2) We can
thus avoid the issue of reduction to physics, the science whose laws predict the behaviour of
'matter' at its simplest. (3) Furthermore, by modeling the negative and positive feedback
mechanisms characteristic of complex systems, complexity theory thereby enables us to ground
the concept of emergence in the effects of such mechanisms.50 (4) And as a last benefit,
complexity theory enables us to dispense with the false problem of ‘downward causation’ by
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showing that the constraints of a pattern, described by an attractor, are not a case of efficient
causality, but instead need to be thought of as a ‘quasi-cause’.51

For DeLanda, Deleuze’s singularity and importance lies in making these three
ways of thinking interact. Something he first did explicitly in D&R. These sciences and
mathematics of complexity and chaos have shown us that equilibrium and predictable
linear causality are special ideal cases and that most of reality most of the time operates
far from equilibrium and, and so as a nonlinear system. 52 For DeLanda one of the
outcomes has been an epistemological shift, that is, a shift in explanatory strategies or
how problems and solutions are understood.

Well-Posed Problems

Linear analysis seeks solutions that permanently solve problems, but this limits us
to problems of a specific kind, generally unremarkable, uninteresting, and unimportant
ones. Where nonlinear synthesis deals with “…well-posed problems… [that] do not
disappear behind their solutions, just like virtual multiplicities [universal singularities] do
not disappear behind actualised individuals.”53 Although DeLanda does not remark upon
51
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the connection, it is clear that ethics is a field that can benefit from his idea of posing
problems in a way that allows for unanticipated, creative solutions. I will return to this
point below.
Posing problems well is about picking remarkable, interesting, and important
problems for which the solutions have not already been decided in advance. Speaking of
scientific experiments, DeLanda writes:
[Scientific experiment is now about] the distribution of the important and the unimportant defining
an experimental problem (what degrees of freedom matter, what disturbances do not make a
difference) [which] are not grasped at a glance the way one is supposed to grasp an essence (or a
clear and distinct idea), but slowly brought to light as the assemblage stabilises itself through the
mutual accommodation of its heterogeneous components.54

DeLanda gets around the whole reductionism question by “proposing a Deleuzean
epistemology that redefines science from the search for laws in nature to the search for
topological regularities in scientific fields, or as he puts it, the distribution of singular and
ordinary points in a problem.”55 These regularities, remember, do not limit the field of

As I discussed in Chapter 4, problems are not reducible to their solutions but rather
are defined by their conditions: a given distribution of the singular and the ordinary, the
important and the unimportant. As such, problems are inherently "obscure yet distinct" and
only acquire clarity in the process which progressively specifies each of their solutions
(DeLanda, ISVP, 220).
... I used as a guiding constraint the avoidance of the categories of typological thought:
resemblance, identity, analogy and contradiction. But I could have as well said that what guides
this construction is the avoidance of the image of thought implied by these categories: "a natural
capacity for thought endowed with a capacity for truth or an affinity with the true ..." [Deleuze,
D&R, 131]. This image ... has the result of turning the plane of immanence [the virtual space
created by the presuppositions entailed by one’s concepts] into a plane of transcendence. Or ... to
trap philosophy within the plane of reference, linking it to linguistic propositions which are either
true of or false of their referents. This manoeuvre ... closes the road to the virtual or the
problematic. [However] if ... the image of thought leads to a plane of immanence, then philosophy
"does not consist in knowing and it is not inspired by truth. Rather it is categories like Interesting,
Remarkable, or Important that determine success or failure" [Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
What Is Philosophy. 1991. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, and Graham Burchell. (New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 1994), 82. (hereafter WIP)]. (DeLanda, ISVP, 221)
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possibility in any absolute or deterministic way, but instead are the ground from which
novelty emerges.
The same can be said about the problems of living and building the human world.
Skyscrapers and cars, to return to the examples above, emerged as solutions to the ‘wellposed problem’ of urban life in a specific space-time, but far from permanently solving
the problem they drove the development of novel formulations of the well-posed problem
of life and the development of further novel solutions and formulations. Cars and
skyscrapers emerged from the interaction of people, networks, organisations,
corporations and many other things and they each, once born, brought people and other
intensive flows together in novels ways. Unanticipated new problems and unanticipated
new goals emerged. Out of those novel combinations came other novel emergences, like
the interstate system and the elevator, and new goals like hitchhiking and elevator sex,
and so other novel combinations and still more emergences, intensities change and
bifurcations are crossed, ad infinitum. Deleuze concludes: “That’s what it’s like on the
plane of immanence: multiplicities fill it, singularities connect with one another,
processes or becomings unfold, intensities rise and fall.”56
Well-posed problems thus enable people to discover regularities and patterns, but
equally to respond to these regularities and patterns creatively. Well-posed problems are
part and parcel of DeLanda’s overall ontology. Here again we see the importance of a
definite perspective on the structure and dynamics of the natural world for our
understanding of the social world, and ultimately of the ethical principles that can best
govern individual experiments in living within it. Alternative worldviews, either idealist
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or physicalist, run the risk of dogmatism. I will examine the problem of dogmatism in
linear thinking in the next section.

The Dogmatic Image of Dichotomous Linear Thinking

Todd may, commenting on Deleuze, says of the nature of dogmatism:
What is the dogmatic image of thought?57 It is not the possession of a few philosophers,
ensconced in their offices, alone with their ideas. Nor is it a treatise to be found in a dusty library,
an arcane or secret program that has been passed down to generations in some sort of intellectual
conspiracy. The dogmatic image of thought is ours. It is our template for conceiving the world.58
The dogmatic image of thought perceives a universe composed solely of physical entities in more
or less predictable relationships with one another, a humanity characterised by narrow norms of
behaviour, a realm of entities rigidly demarcated from one another: these are worlds that constrict
rather than widen the question of how one might live.59

The dogmatic image of thought is our habitual way of thinking; it is what we imagine
thinking to be, reified as what it necessarily is to think; it is the form of thinking, which
has contingently emerged, that has come to be taken as what it necessarily is to think.
One can also call Deleuze’s dogmatic image of thought dichotomous thinking or linearstatic thinking.
Elizabeth Grosz, articulating the Derridian concept of dichotomous thinking, says:
Dichotomous thinking necessarily hierarchizes and ranks the two polarized terms so that one becomes the
privileged term and the other its suppressed, subordinated, negative counterpart.60 The subordinated term is
merely the negation the denial, the absence or privation of the primary term, its fall from grace; the primary
term defines itself by expelling its other and in this process establishes its own boundaries and borders to
create an identity for itself.61
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I hold that the fundamental dichotomy of the dogmatic image of thought is the ideal/real
dichotomy, where the ideal is the primary term of the dichotomy and the real is the
secondary or subordinate term. An important, problematic, ontological ideal that gets
plugged into our ideal/real dichotomous template is the static linear nature of the world.
This structure of thought precludes grasping the real’s nonlinear fluidity. A crucial task
for my argument is to show the inadequacy of this ideal. DeLanda’s nonlinear history, as
explored in 1000yrs, and his realist assemblage theory approach to social ontology in A
New Philosophy of Society provide the basis for this argument. 62
Under the dogmatic image of thought we conceive the world on the basis of pregiven ideals, which unduly limits the field of reality to that which accords with the ideal.
Real possibilities which do not conform to the ideal are excluded, impeding our ability to
experiment and create. Seeing the world as static leads us to look for necessary ideals
towards which we must progress. If the world and humans are necessarily always
already a certain way there must be one best and right way for humans to live. However,
in reality the world and humans are not always already a certain way, and so there is no
one best and right way to live, where ‘best’ means ‘conformity to an abstract ideal’. In a
creative reality, the best way to live is creatively, as I will explain more fully in the final
chapter.63 Belief in such ways has led to events like the holocaust and the Rwandan
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genocides, as those who do not conform to the ideal are liquidated because they do not
(cannot) conform.
DeLanda’s ontology and its nonlinear bottom-up approach dissolve the ideal/real
dichotomy by establishing fluidity (nonlinearity) and feedback (complex mutual
interaction) within and across scales. While DeLanda does not explicitly draw ethical
conclusions, his critique of dogmatically linear thinking prepares the ground for my
ethics of experimentation. It does so by undercutting the ontological grounds for
regulatory ideals that would dogmatically prescribe one way of being as ultimately best.
It does not tell us how we should live, but opens the problem of how one might live.
Note that the question is formulated as ‘how one might live’ rather than how we might
live. ‘One’ can be a person but can also be a species, a city, a planet, a rock, an atom, or
a word. Things like atoms, rocks, and words are what Deleuze would call nonorganic
life. These things, although neither organic nor biological, are on the same ontological
plane as everything else insofar as all is creative complexity driven by difference. They,
like organic life, live in variably replicative populations, are sorted, emerge, and are
sustained, by processes of interaction animated by difference. They too interact and give
birth to things beyond themselves. It is this immanent life (creativity) that replaces
transcendent causes like essences or god. If matter did not do this on its own we would
not be here to pose the problem. While it does not make sense to ask of an atom how it
might live in the same way one might ask a human, it does make sense to ask what any
individual atom might become. The answer is that it might become any number of things

supportive of the best for most. The parameters are determined by the broadest, least actually determining,
material (physical and social) human life requirements.
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depending upon the assemblages it is capable of forming with other atoms. Nature is
creative, in other words, and we can learn from this creativity.
Thus, when faced with the question of how we should live our genuine
development, one of critical self-transformation toward a greater degree of mutual equal
recognition (self-identity, authenticity), is arrested. Simply put, this development is
arrested because we cannot reconcile the discrepancy between our real lives (and what it
might be) and the ideal life imposed as necessary. As a result some tend to just get
through the day, in some cases with the promise of an ideal after life.
Repeatedly asking how we should live has produced a succession of ideals that
appear to be progressive when they are analysed top-down with reference to the current
ideal at the top, be it ‘god’, ‘good’, ‘utopia’, ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘individuality’, or
‘success’. The point is not that these ideals in themselves are bad but rather that when
what they are, how they manifest, how they are understood and enacted, is taken as
necessary rather than contingent and malleable, that problems of limitation arise.
Similarly, today’s choices of jeans, dish soap, window coverings and toothpaste,
limit the idea of freedom to consumer choice. This freedom is just our simple freedom to
choose, not complex freedom to choose what we choose. This simple freedom is not
placed into a dichotomous hierarchy with complex freedom; the only aim is to give each
their due, to prioritise neither over the other. Our current world seems to be a world
where many do not take on the responsibility entailed in their freedom to choose. That is
the responsibility to learn about reality so that better choices can be made, perpetually
producing better choices to be made. Our complex freedom emerges from our simple
freedom, but has emergent properties, capacities and tendencies of its own. From making
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choices in the world emerges making choices that will affect the range of available
choices. A loss of complex freedom is one way to articulate having our development
arrested by false teleology and its ideals.
Marriage, for instance, is commonly held as an ideal human relationship, but in
reality there are many types of marriages and relationships that are all, at least as, perhaps
more, fulfilling and ‘functional’ than a given ideal form of marriage. There are also
forms of relationship that exist in the virtual realm that might be actualised, but as long as
we think with reference to an imposed ideal rather than the real and the goals that emerge
from it, many of these other ways of (experiments in) relating will remain unactualised. 64
Thinking with reference to a specific form of marriage as an ideal can lead a
grandmother to feel bad for her content and developing granddaughter simply because
she is not married and procreating. Simultaneously, it can take away from the
granddaughter’s contentment and the development of what she might be because she
knows she is disappointing, saddening or worrying her grandmother. This ideal
decreases the mutuality and equality of the recognition between them and the overall
degree of it in each of their lives.
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population, and topological thinking with previously discussed. In brief:
… the virtual is the realm of patterns and thresholds, that is, those multiplicities, Ideas, or abstract
machines that structure the intensive morphogenetic processes that produce actual systems and
their behaviours. A behaviour pattern, or a threshold at which a behaviour pattern is triggered,
needs to be ontologically distinguished (or 'modally' distinguished) from behavior … Thus
patterns and thresholds are virtual, while behaviour is actual. An event, in creating new patterns
and thresholds, restructures the virtual. (Protevi, DGE, 25)
As knew elements were born during the formation of the Universe virtual possibility spaces (phase spaces)
were also born.
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Those in relationships that differ from the imposed ideal are recognised by the
others who dogmatically subscribe to the ideal, but only as degrees of deviance from the
norm. Marriage and procreation can emerge purely as a feeling of obligation to others.
This fact however, does not diminish the feeling that the obligation is a real demand.
This demand is made by those whose recognition we require to confirm our own
recognition of ourselves as a self-conscious human; we need what we are conscious of
confirmed (the degree varies). Marriage, when it is the object of dichotomous thinking,
becomes the pull of an ideal rather than something humans are immanently driven
towards. Pull refers to that of an obligation, as distinct from the drive of immanent
responsibilities and desires, things as much felt as reasoned to be what we want and need.
What we are actually driven towards, what we actually recognise and how we want to be
recognised are obscured by the reified ideal. As we can see, what matters from the
DeLandian perspective is not conformity to an ideal, but the possibility of creating a
stable assemblage (a freely negotiated relationship). Unlike in nature, however, where
stability depends upon unconscious bonds, stability of social and individual experiments
depends upon the recognition of others. The ethics of experimentation that I am building
does not predicate recognition on conformity to an ideal, but simply on whether the
experiment works for those directly involved in it as a possible way of being that does not
impede any other person’s way of being human.
When we judge with reference to an ideal, by contrast, deviation from that ideal to
a degree beyond the range of tolerance appears to be a deviation from what it is to be
human according to those doing the judging. May articulates this as follows:
If homosexuality is abnormal, it is an abnormality that swallows up the rest of one’s existence;
every gesture, every emotion is reducible to the core fact of the homosexuality. That is why it
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seems so important to intervene. What is at stake is not simply a deviant form of activity; it is a
deviant form of life.65

The dogmatic image of thought and its prioritisation of linear top-down analyses with
reference to imposed ideals encourage these non-mutual and non-equal forms of
recognition and arrest genuine development.
In reality, treating experiments in living as deviations from an ideal tends to lead
to reactionary or resentful responses or recognitions. Instead, we can recognise what
happens just as something that happened as the result of a process. If we do or do not
like a happening, then we can seek to understand its process so that we can encourage or
discourage its happening accordingly. If we do not like people flying aeroplanes into
buildings then we can try to understand the conditions that support people choosing to do
so and work toward changing those conditions. The same can be said regarding starving
and diseased populations (from fungi to humans) around the world.
Let me take another example. It is not important that the Greeks invented western
philosophy, it is important that it emerged from the interaction of humans in a situation.
The crucial questions are: what are the processes of its emergence, maintenance and
development, what are the interacting parts of the assemblage, what brought them
together and what are the differences that sustain their interaction, and not, ‘how did this
assemblage follow from a pre-given regulatory ideal?’
Genuine development, as has been indicated and as I will elaborate upon in the
final chapter, is development toward a greater degree of mutual equal recognition for all,
entailing a more experimental approach to goal-setting and living. So where might this
abstract goal exist in DeLanda’s reality, given that it does not contain a transcendent
65
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realm? The short answer is the realm of immanent patterns of becoming, or the
immanent patterns of the processes by which things emerge and that sustain them as
actual entities, e.g. the metabolic circuits that sustain biological life. The next section
will deal directly with this realm of patterns called the virtual.

The Virtual

For DeLanda, the general and the particular are replaced by the Deleuzean
concepts universal singular and individual singular. This does not, for example, map
onto the division species (general) and organism (particular). As we have seen both
species and organism are on the same ontological plane; they are both historically
actualised individual singularities. Individual entities or emergences are not identified as
particular manifestations of general categories. They are the unique actualisations of
concrete processes identified by their emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies, all
of which are universal singularities that are shared by populations. They are points or
areas in the phase space (possibility space) of a given population that the members of that
population tend towards.
A phase space is an imaginary space with as many dimensions as 'interesting' variables of a
system; the choice of variables obviously depends on the interests of the modeller. The phase
space model is constructed using a manifold, an n-dimensional mathematical object. The manifold
qua phase space represents the range of behaviour open to the system: 'what a body can do'. 66

These universal singularities are not causal essences or forms, i.e., not the essence of
Raven which causes all Ravens to be Ravens as a more or less ideal manifestation of the
essence. The patterns of the virtual are quasi-causes, that is, these patterns, whatever
66

Protevi, DGE, 21.

42

43
they are (our current list is short), occurring in the flows of matter-energy-informationthought, actualise what there is, but not resemble what there is, as emergent from them.
Though short the list may be, it certainly, through multi-realisability, in a sense explains,
a good bit of reality. The patterns of the virtual are quasi-causal insofar as they do not
directly determine all the unique detailed features of a given actual thing. If they did
there would be a completely unique pattern for each individual thing or kind, they would
be essences. Instead, these patters define a space of possibility in which an unpredictable
number of different concrete realisations emerge.
Universal singularities exist in the no less real realm of the virtual. Universal
singularities can be thought of as diagrams (in the case of the non-biological) and body
plans (in the case of the biological). They are also, importantly, a space of possibilities
structured by certain parameters (degrees of freedom), thresholds of change
(bifurcations), and identifiable patterns (attractors).67 A possibility space, the parameters,
the bifurcations and the attractors are each universal singularities and together a universal
singularity, much like each human is an individual singularity and part of the individual
singularities like friend groups and the human species. The parameters are the
boundaries of the space and the attractors and bifurcations structure the space. Attractors
and bifurcations manifest as the properties, capacities and tendencies, immanent to the
interacting matter-energy-information-thought. They are actualised at certain intensities,
always with a degree of variability, and so uniquely identify the actual individual
singularities.
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A relatively simple example of this, used by DeLanda, is that hurricanes, without
metaphor, embody or actualise the same diagram (universal singularity) as a steam motor.
They are both animated by the same gradients.68 They are both quasi-caused by a certain
pattern that is variably actualised given a range of certain materials at a certain range of
intensities. These real virtual patterns are emergent, that is, immanent to the interaction
of difference, and it is from them that the rich variety of actual reality emerges. His point
is to describe and explain the real processes from which what there is emerges, not just
establish that there are processes and then metaphorically apply a conceptualised process
to establish a logical model on which to found prescriptions for how we should live, or to
argue for the practical perpetuation of the same, or the realisation of the inevitable.
DeLanda’s writes:
When we say (as Marxists used to say) that "class struggle is the motor of history" we are using
the word "motor" in a purely metaphorical sense. However, when we say that "a hurricane is a
steam motor" we are not simply making a linguistic analogy; rather, we are saying that hurricanes
embody the same diagram used by engineers to build steam motors—that is, we are saying that a
hurricane, like a steam engine, contains a reservoir of heat, operates via thermal differences, and
circulates energy and materials through a carnot cycle. (Of course, we may be wrong in ascribing
this diagram to a hurricane, and further empirical research may reveal that hurricanes in fact
operate in a different way, according to a different diagram.)69

Each hurricane is a unique actualisation of a universal singularity (a space of possibilities
structured by certain parameters, bifurcations, and attractors), one, as it currently appears
to our empirical understanding, that when diagramed has a significantly similarly
structured possibility space to that of the steam motors that humans have made. In the
68
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same way, each human is a unique actualisation of an equally unique body plan
(universal singularity), one that is shared by many actual individuals that to varying
degrees share properties, capacities and tendencies. Although given the individuals and
intensities that surround a given individual, which of each of these are actualised in what
combination can and does vary widely (another scale of variation) even within
reproductively isolated species. How actual individuals are grouped depends on which
ones of each of these three are selected as relevant to the study being undertaken.
For instance, a whale, a human and a bird are but very few of those that can be
considered to actualise the body plan that is called chordata. A significant amount of the
biological life on Earth is a topological transformation of this body plan. This body plan
is the assemblage of the properties, capacities and tendencies of certain materials placed
into certain interactions. Given this variety of actualisation, the virtual capacities of an
individual singularity, and more so of a universal singularity, are effectively infinite (a
parameterised infinity, given the matter-energy-information-thought involved and what is
immanent to it), although temporally finite (at least for the foreseeable future), especially
in the case of individual biological organisms. The parameters are not imposed on the
matter involved; the matter involved entails its own parameters given what it is and what
it can do in concert with what it interacts with.
As mentioned, the differences between actual entities that share a universal
singularity are only topological transformations of that universal singularity. This one
way to group entities, that is, to parameterise the space of possibilities with the ‘laws’ of
topology, which is a geometry of non-metric n-dimensional shapes in non-metric ndimensional spaces. From this view, the universal singularity is what remains unchanged
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or invariant through transformations; through all its multiple-realisations. However these
transformations are limited (the aforementioned ‘laws’) or there would be no way to
group things. Topological transformations exclude cutting and gluing, they include
stretching, compressing, and folding. The classic example is that, topologically, a donut
and a coffee cup are the same shape, or share the same topological invariances; one can
be transformed into the other without cutting or making new connections. Universal
singularities are points of topological invariance shared by populations of actual entities.
Between the shape that represents a whale and that which represents a human
topologically, although very different will share points of invariance, these are the
universal singularities shared by humans and whales. These bound a particular space or
universal singularity, but the space of each is one in its own right made up of others that
it shares with other species, those it shares only with its species, those only with its
genetic and social lineages, and those unique to the individual. Things like the need for
quality nourishment, shelter and clothing founded on, encouraged by, and satisfying of
our need for each other socially, are the topological invariants of human life when viewed
as material in phase space.
It will be asked, is this not the reintroduction of essences? In a sense yes, except
these are not eternal, they are historically produced emergences which do not resemble
the actual entities that actualise them. I do not know the exact history, for instance, of the
‘torus’ (one of the patterns [attractors] found to recur in phase space), but there is the
history of the matter-energy-information-thought in the known Universe, and as new
elements emerged and interacted in different ways, there would have been a moment
when the torus pattern first emerged as actualised in certain material. Recall that these
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virtual patterns are immanent to actual material; the virtual is not reducible to the actual,
but it requires the actual. Also the torus pattern as something recognised by humans
emerged in a specific space-time. Thus, the virtual is patterns that define a field of
possibility in which real things emerge. At this point then, we must turn to the crucial
discussion of the forces that drive interaction of elements, the patterns they give rise to,
and thus the emergence of actual things.

The Intensive

The virtual is reality’s immanent patterns of organisation; it is the ways that
matter behaves when animated by intensive gradients, given what that matter actually is,
in given real cases. Gradients are intensive differences in things like temperature,
chemical concentration, and density. They animate the flows of matter-energyinformation-thought out of which the entities that inhabit the reality we are aware of are
assembled, given the parameters of the virtual that are immanent to those flows. In other
words, “virtual multiplicities (viewed as self-posed ontological problems) depend on
intensive assemblages like ecosystems to progressively give rise to ontological
solutions,” like orchids and wasps.70 There are virtual problems in the human realm as
well. For example, humans cohabitating generates virtual problems of relationship
negotiation, but these problems are not instances of ideal types, but follow from the fact
that human beings cohabitate.
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The intensive is that which animates matter-energy-information-thought. There is
an isomorphism between the patterns generated by systems animated by intensive
differences and patterns produced in other complex systems. Isomorphism captures
something similar to multi-realisability. For instance, there is isomorphism between
patterns observable in things like the internet, computer simulations, human
transportation, and the weather. Consider the chemical gradients that animate the
development of ovum. DeLanda on embryogenesis:
The egg … possesses an obscure yet distinct structure defined by zones of biochemical
concentration and by polarities established by the asymmetrical position of the yolk (or nucleus).
But even though it does possess the necessary biochemical materials and genetic information,
these materials and information do not contain a clear and distinct blueprint of the final
organism.71 [But]… a gene encodes for a messenger RNA in nurse cells when translated form a
protein and this protein forms a gradient in the egg, where the concentration dictates body regions,
head, thorax and abdomen.72

Again, I want to stress the role of creative and unpredictable outcomes. There are only
quasi-causal patterns, not absolute determination of outcome, whether in nature or
society.
The intensive as animator or process and change is open to greater or lesser
degrees of intentionality in the emergence of novel virtualities (problems), and thus also
novel responses. This is significant for history and emergent goals because human social
life, although it does generate its own directionality, is ultimately responsive to conscious
decision-making. If it were not, ethics would be inconceivable, and therefore, so too my
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ethics of experimentation (conscious creation of new possibilities for living). Different
emergent goals are possible for us depending upon how we understand the natural and
social worlds of which we are a part. We can, as DeLanda does, look at the rise and fall
of particular populations in terms of things like the intensity of trade allowed by the
intensity of connection allowed by the intensity, frequency, and shape of air and sea
currents between particular locations and populations. Underlying material patterns
generate pressures and opportunities, but what actually happens depends also on the
choices people within these patterns make in response to these pressures. Reality, for
DeLanda, that which actually happens in any given context, is the outcome of the
interaction between the virtual and the intensive.

The Virtual The Intensive and The Actual: Reality

A bottom-up approach can show us “… intensive processes which generate actual
forms … [and that] concrete mechanisms of immanence explain … how the virtual is
produced out of the actual.”73 These mechanisms are simply and amazingly what happens
when different things interact. As much as the virtual is the plans, the quasi-cause, for
what might be actual, the virtual is immanent to the actual; “echoing without resembling
each other”.74 DeLanda:
... in ... [this] ontology there exist two histories, one actual and one virtual, having complex
interactions with one another. On one hand there is a historical series of actual events genetically
involved in the production of other events, and on the other, an equally historical series of ideal
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events defining an objective realm of virtual problems of which each actualised individual is but a
specific solution.75

Human history encodes infinite possibilities for realisation; actual history is the path
actually taken, the ethics of experimentation seeks out paths not taken but virtually
present for actualisation of we so choose.
Let us take the example of this thesis. The interactions of me, my advisor, and
many other things including flows of biomass, electricity, and language, actualised this
thesis as symbols printed on paper and bound in pleather. The interaction of these actual
things, the assemblage of their degrees of freedom, produced the space of possibilities
within which the thesis emerged. The shape of that space, the trajectories of the things
interacting in that space, and where and how those trajectories gather and stabilise is the
virtual diagram of the thesis (though actually mapping a space this complex is currently
still beyond our technical skill. These areas of gathering or stabilisation are the attractors
of the space. Among others, these attractors are actualised in sleeping, eating, working,
recreating, linguistic, seasonal, and social patterns. The space of the thesis, though
perhaps less importantly, perhaps still interestingly, also has areas involving things like
meteorological, climatic, and geological patterns.
One way attractors can be identified is by their temporal manifestation. They can
be steady, periodic, or chaotic. Another way is identifying them in terms of flow. These
flows can be laminar, wavy, or turbulent. Each of these has a basic form in topological
phase space, a point, a circle, and a complex fractal shape, respectively.
Knowing about the above distinctions between different attractors adds detail to
viewing things in terms of phase space. In the space of the thesis one could think about
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the different attractors for the different flows involved. Being aware of these universal
but still singular patterns allows us a different way of understanding and perhaps
controlling the patterns of our lives. Having this way of distinguishing things adds itself
to our other ways, and can help us understand and so design the systems and outputs we
do, in more detailed, controlled, and experimental ways. One might consider things
quasi-caused by chaotic attractors interesting and important and so in the processes of
writing something intentionally move their sleep cycle and other life patterns away from
previously stable patterns. Or observing themselves they may notice that when in a
processes of writing they tend to move away from regularity, and so, chose to take steps
to maintain regularity. Attractors give us another way to think about these things.
Thinking this way can help you to look at the real patterns in your life. How do you
really spend your space-time? What really composes your space-times and in what
ways? Be real about it. I argue that having the conditions to do so is a responsibility to
do so and to help create the conditions for more to do so. This is a real pattern, we can
encourage it.
However, to reiterate, these patterns, isomorphic across scales and realms, define
general parameters but do not determine absolutely. Multi-realisability works
ubiquitously; that things are multi-realisable supports these patterns being realised across
scales and realms but also supports these realisations (actualisations) of the patterns
themselves being multi. That there are shared quasi-causal patterns does limit what is
actualised. Furthermore, that one pattern is being actualised at one moment does not
preclude a shift to another pattern in a future moment. The significance of this point for
social ontology and ethics should be apparent.
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The move from one attractor to another can be within a type (one periodic to
another) or from one type to another (steady to chaotic), they can go in any direction and
lack perfect predictability due to infinite sensitivity to the infinitesimal at critical
moments of transition. These transitions are the previously mentioned bifurcations where
natural or social reality unfolds in one way rather than another. The next section will
discuss them in more detail.

Bifurcation

Bottom-up approaches, like DeLanda’s approach to history in 1000yrs, along with
the sciences that are integral to his view, show us that things are especially unpredictable
at or around bifurcations. A bifurcation is the threshold (space-time, situation, degree of
intensity) when and where something shifts from one relatively stable state to another,
from one pattern to another, away from their current attractor to another; it is like a phase
transition, for example freezing, or the onset of turbulence.
At all space-times, even highly controlled scientific experiments, there are factors
not accounted for that lead to a novel and unexpected emergence. Away from or
nowhere near a bifurcation any number of things may be added or taken away without
consequence, but, at or near a bifurcation, a small variation can catalyse a completely
different emergence than given some other variation, or the same variation at a slightly
different space-time. For instance, someone having never encountered water would have
no way of predicting that at certain temperature intensities H2O shifts between gas, solid,
and liquid, especially given the range of temperatures that are, for most humans, of no
obvious consequence to water, ice, and steam. Having then encountered H2O and its
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bifurcations within a range of temperature intensities they would be able to predict the
occurrence and outcome of its bifurcations (as see it as the same thing exiting
differently). However, even in this relatively simple case the predictions can only have a
degree of probability and accuracy since the exact conditions of and outcomes for these
bifurcations are variable depending on, for instance, atmospheric pressure and dissolved
substances in the water, but also the precision of the thermometer used. The first two are
material factors affecting the change of state, the thermometer though not an important
material factor (though its presence would absorb or add a portion of the energy affecting
the H2O) it is an important factor for the accuracy of human prediction. None of these
things noticeably matter with reference to the state of the water until near or at the
bifurcation, when a small variation in any of the important parameters has a marked
effect on the occurrence and outcome of the bifurcation. This can be observed in the
wide variety of precipitation that forms in Earth’s turbulent atmosphere.
We can apply like reasoning to human history. Think of the whole of humanity as
a material, a fluid, something with intensity and that is affected by intensities. As human
population increases its own intensity increases, along with all the matter-energyinformation-thought flows associated with humans i.e., genes, memes, minerals,
electricity, water, oil, biomass, money, and so on. Who knows when a bifurcation might
be crossed and what unanticipated possibilities for living might arise as a consequence.
For instance—to speak in vary broad terms—an intensification of population density in
Detroit followed by a sharp decrease, given innumerable other factors, including many
fires, has ended up entailing an emerging population of urban farms and farmers. There
came a time when this may have been predicted by somebody, but not too long ago
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nobody would have predicted it, it was not part of the plan. There was no plan.
Intensities changed, bifurcations were crossed, different attractors became actualised, and
so Detroit has urban farms and farmers. Detroit, with its early mass deployment of the
car, was also the birth place of the mall. We did not invent cars to get to the mall, nor
were they conceived together as part of a grand plan. The point is to look at what really
happened, what were the actual dynamics that led to the expansion of Detroit and then its
loss of population. Did people leave because of crime, because they were encouraged to
by marketing, because they wanted to, because they could, because they were racist,
because of a loss of jobs? Why was there crime, why did marketing go the direction it
did (and the answer is not simply money, we can look at actual studies and histories of
actual marketing and formulate an amendable concrete answer), why did people want to,
how were they able to, why and how racism (a relatively old and young question
extensively answered, far from permanently solved), why less jobs, why ‘jobs’ at all?
There is a multitude of factors at a multitude of scales.
Because of our immediate spatio-temporal scale we spend most of our time
between bifurcations, or within ones that proceed just slowly enough for us to easily not
notice. In an apparently stable world the deterministic laws of the current apparently
static state of things tend to dominate. However, as discussed, at or around a bifurcation
subtle “fluctuations and random elements play an important role.”76 The same small thing
that happened without consequence a million space-times before can now affects
characteristics of the state of things post-bifurcation. Some argue that this simply makes
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it a technical problem of accounting for all factors, but given that the closer to the
bifurcation the smaller the fluctuation needs to be, it is a regress to the infinitely
infinitesimal. There will always be a scale smaller and bigger than we are able to
perceive that will affect the outcome of bifurcations. While this absence of perfect
knowledge of initial conditions rules out perfect prediction and control, it grounds the
possibility of exploration and experimentation across natural and social reality. This
possibility of novel experimentation has both an evolutionary significance for humanity
(without experiment and change we will certainly die), but more importantly an ethical
significance: it enables us to live freely and together in the context of mutual recognition
of new ideas for living.
However, as much as scale discloses unpredictability, entities at different scales
are emergent and so have properties, capacities, and tendencies independent from their
parts at other scales. It is this reality that has allowed us, at a given range of scales, to
predict certain things, to a degree, using the various methods and tools built up through
history. These methods and tools themselves are evolving spaces of possibility structured
by attractors and bifurcations. Attractors are the regularities that stabilise, temporarily, a
given system. The next section will discuss attractors in more detail.

Attractors

Mathematically, attractors are patterns or tendencies of a system as viewed ‘in’
phase space, the areas surrounding them, the area within which trajectories are drawn into
its pattern, are called basins of attraction. The scare quotes on ‘in’ are a reminder that
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phase space is an abstract mathematical construct to experiment with interactions and
rates of change, it is non-metric, its shapes are not shapes, its spaces not space, it is ndimensions of possibility, it is a realm of instantaneous values where the behavior of
interacting components emerge as patterns and trajectories. John Protevi does some work
similar to DeLanda’s. Protevi’s article, DGE, has been and will continue to be used as a
means to further and alternatively define some of the aspects of the conception of reality
and emergence being promoted by this thesis. Protevi writes the following concerning
attractors, basins of attraction, and bifurcations:
... the areas of phase space surrounding attractors - representing normal behaviour of the system in
one or another of its behaviour patterns - are called 'basins of attraction'. The behaviour patterns
described by attractors are formed by the action of negative feedback mechanisms. The layout of
attractors in the phase space, which describes the layout of the patterns of behaviour of the system,
is defined by the layout of singularities, which are mathematical objects that define the topological
structure of the manifold; a singularity is a point where the graph of the function changes direction
… A singularity in the manifold indicates a bifurcator in the phase space model which in turn
represents a threshold where the real system changes qualitatively … A singularity ... defines
where attractors are found by indicating the limits of basins of attraction … In model terms, in
zones of sensitivity or crisis situations we find fractal borders between basins of attraction, so that
any move, no matter how small and in no matter what direction, might - or might not - trigger the
move to another basin of attraction. Here we have an irreducible element of 'chance' even though
the system is thoroughly deterministic.77

However, a point of clarification is necessary. The singularities described above are
equated with bifurcations, which is how the term is employed by mathematicians.
Deleuze took this term and widened from a mathematical object in phase space to capture
reality (the multi-realisable virtual, and the individual actual) because it indicates
remarkable points of interest and importance (like bifurcations). The “action of negative
feedback mechanisms” in the above quotation is analogous to the feedback discussed
earlier.
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Attractors function by drawing out a particular possibility virtual within a given
material context to create an individual singularity. The number of parameters and
attractors defines the degree of complexity of any system. A pendulum and a soap
bubble are examples of single point or steady attractor phase spaces, coming to rest
perpendicular to Earth and minimizing surface tension respectively. A more complex
example would be the attractors that are common to the formation of all solid
precipitation, that which, though each snowflake is a uniquely singular embodiment of it,
remains common to all. Is it the water, the process of freezing or physical features of the
speck of dust at its core that make each snow flake unique but identifiable? The answer
is all of the above, and infinitely more, in combination; the formation of a snow flake is
an example of nonlinear causality. It is the same component materials, the same process,
the same diagram that is actualised each time, but each flake is a unique product. What
emerges from the combination of the components and the different intensities that drive
the process is an individual singularity with properties, capacities, and tendencies
different than those of its parts. These emergent characteristics of the whole supersede
those of the parts considered in abstraction.
Let me flesh this point out by returning to the example of this thesis. It as an
actual thing actualises attractors (there are multiple and varied attractors given the
complexity, that is, the number of things involved, and their number of degrees of
freedom). As for the writer, as part of the process of actualising a thesis, his development
is being animated by, among other things, his complex attraction (in some ways steady,
periodic, and chaotic) to actualising his ideas as a defensible thesis. In the human
intentional realm I equate goals and attractors. This equation anticipates adding a
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normative emergent telos and goal to nonlinear material reality. At this point let me
return to the example of the writer:
In the final semester of his BA the goal of his ideas being expressed as a major
paper propelled him to attend writing workshops, to go to student services, then the
‘special needs’ department, which led to psychological testing which led to strategies and
tools for completing essays (some of which were added to his existing process). His
writing has always suffered an inability to reconcile what he actually wrote with the ideal
image he had of an academic essay. Rather than just trying to say what he wanted to say
using the materials available he struggled to make essays be like some vague notion of
what an essay is supposed to be like. The focus was the ideal form rather than the real
content, not that a ‘form’ is not important, but that it should emerge from what is trying
to be said—also not that this thesis has actualised in such a form. Even when the essays
were ‘complete’, i.e. handed in, he was alienated from them and the development that
could have come from them was to a degree arrested; they could not be recognised as
something with which he identified.
Faced with a reified ideal that the real tends to be irreconcilable with, people tend
to give up or sabotage themselves by, for example, misusing durations of time; they are
left to wallow in the devalued real whose development, along with their own as part of it,
has been arrested. Had the goal of expressing his ideas in essay form not been there, and
been strong enough, he would have given up out of frustration.
Another example is when the ideal telos of an impossible to attain body type
leads people to devalue their real body and arrests the development of what it really
(virtually and actually) might be. In some cases not only arresting development but
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turning to even more explicit self-destruction. On the other hand the genuine (emergent,
contingent) goal of health for a given body animates the development of what that body
really might be. 78
Though the writer’s development and that of the essay were arrested to a degree,
because the goal of expressing his ideas in essay form inhibited him, he was still driven
to keep trying, to keep developing. How and why? Along with natural and more
removed situational factors, an important factor was the encouraging support of other
humans and social wholes. In other words, there was sufficient recognition of his value
and the value of the project from others to sustain his efforts to the degree adequate for
the project’s completion. Equally he and the project were adequately recognisant of what
needed to be to the degrees adequate to result in the completion of the project. All of
which could have proceeded any number of other ways, but proceeded the way it did and
has resulted in these words; strange, interesting, and important given the creativity of
reality.
To sum up: I argue that there is an ethically important equation between
attractors and goals. It is on this equation that I found the notion that DeLanda’s reality
has room for emergent teloi and goals. It is in the virtual realm of immanent patterns of
becoming that one might find something like an emergent goal. An emergent goal that,
given that there are better and worse experiments, answers, happenings, lifestyles and
thoughts, does not lead us to reified social and political structures that limit the
actualisation of human capacities and contentment. So while it is effectively infinitely
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open to difference, it is ethically not open to things that limit sustained human
actualisation of physical, social, and mental capacities and contentment. I submit mutual
equal recognition as a universal singularity (immanent pattern) that is actualised by the
emergences that are better for the largest number of humans over the largest duration. A
more detailed understanding of emergence would be beneficial if we are going to think
about the emergence of goals within DeLanda’s reality populated by equally real
emergent assemblages. To recap some of what has been said about what it is to be an
emergent assemblage. To be emergent entails having properties, capacities, and
tendencies, not present in ones components, and so entails not be reducible to those parts.
It entails there being no fundamental parts and no fundamental wholes, everything is
equally a whole-part, considering something a part or a whole is relative to the scales
being considered. The concept assemblage captures being a historical, emergent, wholepart, which equally entails being dependent on the interaction process of parts, which
entails being open and changeable. Being open and change-able means that parts can
come and go, assemblages can exchange parts, parts can birth new assemblages. All
things, from rocks to thoughts, are equally but differently assemblages that emerge from
and catalyse creative complexity driven by difference.
Emergent properties are what allow us to comprehend the development of
qualitative differences within an exhaustive conception of the real as material. All things
which are are assemblages of material elements, but they are not all reducible to the parts
from which they develop. We need concepts appropriate to the qualitatively distinct
assemblages that emerge: chemical, biological, social, ethical. The next chapter will
examine the crucial concept of emergent properties in more detail, comparing DeLanda’s
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understanding with those of other important thinkers in the field. These other
approaches will both supplement DeLanda, but also illustrate the greater overall
explanatory power of his approach for the purposes of this thesis. This chapter on
emergent properties will also serve as the hinge that takes us from the problem of
ontology generally to the problem of social order and individual experimentation with
which the thesis will conclude.
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CHAPTER III
EMERGENCE

Introduction

As mentioned above, it is through emergence that the conceptual link is drawn
between DeLanda’s neo-realist ontology and Russon’s ethics of recognition. For both
thinkers emergence is part of a contingent reality pregnant with possibility. I will
highlight the features of DeLanda’s account of emergence that makes it particularly
appropriate for my project by contrasting it with Michael Silberstein and John
McGeever’s, Robert Korn’s, John Protevi’s, and Margret Archer’s ‘emergentist’ thought.
Archer’s work will be used to complete the bridge implied but not developed in
DeLanda’s thought between general ontology human society, agency, and ethical
principles.

DeLanda: Properties, Capacities, and Tendencies

For DeLanda, the identities of concrete emergent wholes, those whose existence
can be known, are defined by their emergent properties, capacities and tendencies.79
These concrete emergent wholes are sustained by the interaction of wholes at other scales
(the parts of a given whole), wholes with their own properties, capacities, and tendencies
that emerge from the interaction of other wholes (their parts). For example, as I
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discussed in the previous chapter, a species as much as an organism has a birthday (event
of speciation) and potential death (event of extinction). DeLanda writes: “The human
species exists ‘alongside’ the human organisms that compose it ... in an ontological plane
populated only by historically individuated entities”.80 In addition to differing in scale,
“the historically contingent identities of ... [individual entities are] defined by their
emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies”.81 Properties, capacities, and tendencies
are all emergent aspects of emergent individuals. I will use the example of a that
DeLanda employs in the introduction to Philosophy & Simulation, to further explain
these key points.
Properties of a whole are always actual. In the case of a knife the emergent
property of sharpness (a triangular cross section which emerges from the interaction of
metallic atoms in a particular way, a way whose process of emergence and maintenance
includes humans) is always actual for a knife. Capacities of a whole may go unactualised; the capacity of a knife to cut may never be actualised. Further, when a
capacity is actualised it is not as a state, but as an event. In the case of the knife, the
relevant event is cutting. Also, the event of a capacity being actualised “is always
double: [in the case of a knife] to cut-to be cut.” Something’s capacity being actualised
requires the existence of a situation that enables the exercise of that capacity. A knife
needs cuttable things to exercise its capacity to cut. “Thus, while properties can be
specified without reference to anything beyond themselves, capacities to affect must
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always be thought in relation to capacities to be affected.”82 It is worth noting that
capacities can be relative to scale. Something that cannot be cut at one scale can be cut
at another. For example, at the scale common to humans a knife has the capacity to cut
flesh, while at the molecular scale a human scale knife might compress something, more
likely just displace, but most likely do nothing at all. A knife can cut organs and
organisms but not individual molecules.
While properties and capacities are distinct from each other, DeLanda also
describes a complex symmetry between them. On the one hand, capacities depend on
properties—to cut and to be cut depends on the property of sharpness. On the other hand,
sharpness emerges from metallic atoms exercising their capacities to interact in certain
ways and, to anticipate, manifesting their tendency toward solidity within certain
intensive ranges. In other words, the relation of properties and capacities is relative to
scale. At one scale, capacities depend on properties. However, when we view reality at
multiple scales we see that the properties at one scale depend on the capacities of the
parts at scales below.83 A friend network and its properties depends on its members
capacities, for example, to communicate and remember.
As for tendencies, these are things that manifest themselves relative to different
intensities. For instance, the metal of a knife has the emergent property of solidity but at
certain intensities of temperature it manifests its tendency to liquefy and at even greater
intensities, to gasefy. At a certain intensity of conflict a given friend network will

82

Philosophy & Simulation, 3-4

83

DeLanda, Philosophy & Simulation, 4

64

65
manifest a tendency to break apart. At a certain lack of intensity of contact between its
members a tendency to dissolve.
Tendencies and capacities are ontologically similar insofar as they are both real
but can go unactualised. When they are actualised, they are actualised as events. The
main difference is that tendencies are typically finite while capacities are not because of
their correlation with the capacities to be affected of countless other things.84 “Capacities
involve a much larger set of possibilities than tendencies because entities can exercise
their capacities in interaction with a potentially innumerable variety of other entities.”85
The more complex an entity is, the greater the number of tendencies it has. For example,
a human friend network has a much greater variety of possible tendencies than a
sharpened piece of metal. Recall that more complexity is the same thing as more highly
organised. A fluid body of mixed temperatures is more complex, than one of uniform
temperature, insofar as there are the patterns that emerge from the interaction of the
different temperature intensities. By the same description the mixed body is more highly
organised insofar as there is coherent organised movement of its constituent parts. This
is a way of conceptualising how more complexity is not merely a quantitative but also
and importantly qualitative. A shift to more complexity, like the shift from atom to
molecule, to human, is by some measures a quantitative shift up in the degree of
complexity and organisation from the parts which precede, but it is also a qualitative shift
in complexity and organisation and importantly in the creative freedom that can be
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enabled in dealing with the situations of life at these scales of greater creative complexity
driven by difference.
Before moving forward, let me reiterate some key elements of the idea of
emergence. Emergent properties are animated by the interaction of differences.
Emergent wholes are objectively irreducible to their constituent parts. Finally, they are
not closed totalities but individual entities capable of novel activity. Especially significant
are those emergent properties associated with life. As DeLanda argues “... it is hard to
see how we could specify mechanisms of emergence for life or mind in general, as
opposed to accounting for the emergent properties and capacities of concrete wholes like
a metabolic circuit, an assembly of neurons,”86 or the 2012 philosophy department at the
University of Windsor.
The next section will continue the process of detailing DeLanda’s conception of
emergence and supporting its use for this thesis. Specifically, the distinction Silberstein
and McGeever make between epistemological and ontological emergence will be
discussed in relation to my reading of DeLanda.

Silberstein and McGeever87

I begin with a quotation from Silberstein & McGeever:
... [We] distinguish epistemological emergence, where emergence is merely an artefact of a
particular model or formalism generated by macroscopic analysis, functional description or some
other kind of 'higher-level' description or explanation, from cases that potentially involve
ontological emergence. By this we mean features of systems or wholes that possess causal
capacities not reducible to any of the intrinsic causal capacities of the parts nor to any of the
86
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(reducible) relations between the parts. Emergent properties are properties of a system taken as a
whole which exert a causal influence on the parts of the system consistent with, but distinct from,
the causal capacities of the parts themselves. Ontological emergence therefore entails the failure of
part—whole reductionism.... Part—whole reductionism says that all wholes are completely
reducible to their most basic parts (entities without parts). There are two ways of cashing this. The
first, as in Scharf, is as follows: “a whole is explained by being shown to be nothing but the parts,
inter-related in a certain manner ... micro-reduction requires that compound elements (objects
composed of parts) and their properties be explainable in terms of their parts and their interrelations”.88 Kim89, on the other hand, puts the point thus: “wholes are completely determined,
causally and ontologically, by their parts”.90

We have here two more thinkers opposed to reductionism, but more than that we
have a distinction not explicitly present in DeLanda, that between epistemological and
ontological emergence. The value of their work is that they give us the term—
ontological emergence—that we need to fully understand DeLanda’s position, for it is
clear that ontological emergence is what DeLanda is talking about. He would agree that
“ontological emergence (the failure of part-whole reductionism) is the most interesting
and important kind of emergence.”91 They also agree that emergence not only blocks
philosophical essentialism and sociological micro-reductionism, but from science, “the
very idea that the stuff at the bottom (whether it be fundamental laws or fundamental
entities) provides the ultimate explanation for all phenomena.”92
However, Silberstein & McGeever do have a problem with disciplines that look to
“dynamical systems theory, with its characterisation of nonlinear systems ... [to] provide
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support for the existence of some sort of emergence.”93 This approach is the one
DeLanda takes. Silberstein & McGeever’s critique amounts to the claim that the users of
nonlinear dynamics tend towards epistemological emergence. Referring to cases where a
theorist simply points to nonlinear complexity and claims emergence i.e. that it only
appears emergent because we cannot otherwise explain it, yet.94
Below is a graphic summary of what Silberstein takes to be the main versions of
ontological and epistemological emergence.

Relata of emergence95
Real world items

Representational items

ONT-emergence between

EPIST-emergence between

Parts/wholes

Concepts

Properties

Theories

Events/processes

Models

Causal capacities

Frameworks

Laws

Laws

Entities …

States of a dynamical system…
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The distinction between these two types of emergence, for the purposes of this thesis, is
fairly straight forward. However, for the purposes of explicit philosophy of science a
more fine grained analysis would be appropriate.96
To reiterate, in general terms, something is epistemologically emergent when it is
considered emergent merely because we do not know how to explain it. “Emergentists
will propose level-specific laws, while reductionists will claim them to be merely
'epistemological emergence' or simply markers of our (temporary) ignorance.”97 In more
detail, Silberstein & McGeever argue in relation to this distinction that
The first problem is whether any specific claim is merely an epistemological one regarding the
ineliminable nature (emergence) of some 'higher-level' description or explanation, or whether it is
a robust ontological claim about the emergence of some novel feature of reality. If the former, then
we should ask why the higher-level description or explanation is ineliminable. ... what exactly is
being alleged to emerge from what? For example, is it properties, property instances, entities, new
laws or dynamics that are being alleged to emerge? We must also ask how the emergence of the
new feature is alleged to occur, and what relations it bears to that from which it emerged.98

Answering these questions (and others) is analogous to what DeLanda undertakes in all
his analyses of entities and processes.
However, their argument might also be read as specifically challenging something
like DeLanda’s conception of the virtual and what populates it. He most explicitly and
succinctly makes his case for the reality of the virtual as emergent and being populated
by real emergences in the first two chapters of Philosophy & Simulation, and the most
detailed presentation is in ISVP. Recall from the previous chapter that the virtual and its
inhabitants came to be with and evolve through the interaction of actual things, and it can
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be actually represented mathematically and computationally. Recall also that it can be
thought about as the realm of problems for which actualities are solutions. When the
interactions that sustain a given virtuality cease, it dies. For instance, the virtual problem
of a body trying to maintain itself afloat in water, for which there are effectively infinite
solutions, would not be real if there were no bodies and no water. So virtualities are
ontologically real emergent properties of actual systems, because they are the ground of
possibility of what actual systems can do:
Do [virtual entities] exist, for example, as transcendent entities in a world beyond that of matter
and energy? Or are they immanent to the material world? If all the matter and energy of the
universe ceased to exist, would [virtual entities] also disappear (immanent) or would they continue
to exist (transcendent)?
If [virtual entities] are immanent they must be both irreducible to any particular material
process while at the same time requiring that some process or another actually exists. This implies
that topological facts about possibility spaces can be discovered without reference to the nature of
the degrees of freedom, only to their number, and without reference to the nature of the gradient
(thermal, gravitational, mechanical, chemical) only to its existence. But the fact that the existence
of a gradient, any gradient, is necessary confirms the immanent status of [virtual entities]. [Virtual
entities] are, therefore, perfectly acceptable entities in a materialist philosophy.99

Thus, the superior value of DeLanda’s understanding of reality as including
virtuality is that it gives us a more inclusive conception of ontological emergence than in
Silberstein & McGeever. Cases of ‘epistemological’ emergence, perhaps most common
for us at our scale, remain themselves cases of emergences from interactions animated by
gradients in various ways at various scales and automatically entail the emergence of new
virtual problems. Moreover, at least through the actions of humans these emergences
will in some way have a material, intensive, and so again actual manifestation in the
world. I argue that for DeLanda, as manifest in his commitment to a flat ontology, all
emergence is ‘ontological’ or that the distinction between epistemological and
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ontological emergence does not matter. In the end, Silberstein & McGeever appear to be
in agreement.
It is possible that, in such a radically relational [interactive] world, the standard divisions and
hierarchies between phenomena that are considered fundamental and emergent, aggregate and
simple, kinematic and dynamic, and perhaps even between what is considered physical, biological
and mental, are redrawn and redefined [a la Deleuze/DeLanda]. These divisions will be dependent
on what question is being put to nature and what scale of phenomena is being probed. Again in
such a world there will be no discrete hierarchy of causally closed levels. Ontological emergence
means monism without reductionism.
The obvious move for physicalists to make in response to all this is to try to screen off
any ontological emergence from the macroscopic world. ... First, ontological emergence within
quantum mechanics makes it plausible that it exists elsewhere, even if it is not quantum
mechanical in nature. Second, either everything is reducible to fundamental physics or it is not. If
it is reducible, if everything is quantum mechanical, then ontological emergence is ubiquitous ...
If, on the other hand, the macroscopic is not reducible to the microscopic ... then the entire world
of classical objects is somehow ontologically emergent. In short, ontological emergence is most
probably a real feature of the world.100

Again I promote DeLanda because of his thoroughgoing inclusivity. The next section
will discuss Korn’s conception of emergence and his view of causal hierarchies, showing
how he too is not inclusive enough, a conclusion which further supports my choice to use
DeLanda as the ontological basis of the arguments of this thesis.

Korn

In “The Emergence Principle in Biological Hierarchies” Korn is attempting to
rehabilitate the concept of hierarchy within biology. His motivations for doing this are
not explicit, though some are indicated and will be so in this section i.e. that things lower
on the hierarchy are ‘freer’, from which normative/social implication could be drawn. To
begin, a quotation from Korn about his conception of hierarchy and its relation to
emergence:
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I have developed a ... concept of a hierarchy that can be used to inspect the phenomenon of
emergence ... A hierarchy is held together by descending constraints and new features can arise
when an upper level entity restrains its components in new combinations that are not expected
when viewing the components...101

Here Korn’s conception of hierarchy, as will be seen, are analogous to Archer’s
conception of stratification (which is similar to scale as it has been presented). Korn’s
hierarchies are stratified (scaled) emergent wholes. While he says they are more than the
sum of their parts, there is also the indication of a commitment to downward causation.
He holds that wholes are different from their parts but tweaks it as follows:
Components of a hierarchy, however, are constrained and have less freedom of activity than they
did before they entered the hierarchy, leading to the conclusion that the whole is much less than
the sum of its parts when the parts are considered in an unconstrained context.102

Korn explains why this qualification concerning ‘freedom’ is important:
A pendulum clock tells time which none of its parts can even begin to do because the parts are
fashioned and arranged in a specific manner so that the constraints make the whole function
coordinately as a clock. The parts, however, can be refashioned and rearranged into a toy crane, a
dentist's drill or a primitive analog computer.103

We see that Korn is referring to the virtual capacities of the parts, but he (as the
reductionist he is) is prioritising the lower levels of the hierarchies he seems to impose as
necessary. However, as we have seen entities at each scale are ontologically equal, they
each have an equally effectively infinite list of virtual capacities. Parts as ‘constrained’
within wholes, thanks to relations of exteriority, maintain their capacities and in a sense
gain those of the whole they are interacting to sustain. New spaces of possibility are
opened to parts by being part of a whole. While some of their capacities are blocked
(constrained) by coming together as a whole, these capacities are not lost, and others are
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gained. When a human body assembles with a bicycle certain capacities, like walking or
crawling are not available to be actualised, but they are not lost and a whole new range
are opened by being part of this assemblage. It is about the quality as well as the quantity
of freedom. An atom may have a great amount of freedom as an atom, it could be part of
a planet, a human, or a star, but what can and does it actually do as an individual atom?
What can and does it actually do as part of a molecule? Things it cannot do as an
atomised atom. An atom floating in a void may have all of its infinite possibilities, but
that is all it has, it does not and cannot do anything. A human would be less free, have
less opportunity to learn and develop without the hierarchies and meshworks that we are
part of (‘constrained’ by). This is not to deny that there are assemblages that reduce the
freedom of their parts, it is to reserve the concept for human situations that do constrain
human freedom to actualise capacities.
Korn ends up reifying scales and preferring the lower to the higher. He accepts
emergence but wants to make simpler things more free. He describes inverted
hierarchies, where the most ‘free’ elements are on the bottom and as we move up to
emergent scales, where things can do things their parts cannot, the distinguishing feature
is not the novel properties, capacities and tendencies (novel freedoms), but how wholes
constrain their parts. This approach is the opposite of the one DeLanda adopts. For
DeLanda, parameters or degrees of freedom or constraints are important but they are not
primary or fundamental. They are equally part of a reality of creative complexity driven
by difference, and it is the way that constraint produces novelty and creative solutions
that are fundamental to the ethical concerns of my argument. For example, being part of
social justice movements ‘constrained’ (changed) what one could and did do, but also
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enabled women to vote (it changed the mixture of the infinite calculus of how things are
constrained and enabled). In a broad sense constraint is ubiquitous insofar as interaction
parameterised by emergent properties, capacities, and tendencies is ubiquitous (the same
for enablement). That anything is free to do anything at all entails interaction,
enablement and constraint. Moreover, speaking to constraint in a narrower sense similar
to Korn’s, we will see in the next section that there is emergence that does not involve
constraint but the emergence of novelty within a given set of parameters that expands, at
least alters, those parameters. The next section will briefly look at three types of
emergence distinguished by Protevi.

Protevi

Protevi distinguishes diachronic, synchronic and transverse emergence. These
three terms help conceptualise the wider view of emergence being promoted by this
thesis. In general terms, diachronic is the emergence of novelty, synchronic is the
emergence of order (which can of course be novel), and transverse is the emergence of
assemblages that have biological, social and/or technical components. Protevi also calls
transverse emergence and its observation/analysis/simulation ‘political physiology’.104
Synchronic emergence, according to Protevi is
... definition: a synchronically emergent structure is that which enables focused systematic
behaviour through constraining the action of component parts. This definition encapsulates what
Thompson and Varela 2001105 call 'reciprocal causality': the mutual constitution of local-to-global
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or 'upward' causality that produces focused systematic behaviour and the global-to-local or
'downward' causality that constrains the local interactions of components. Synchronic emergence
is the emergence of 'order out of chaos' as the popular formula has it.106

Protevi notes that this type of emergence has unfortunately dominated much of the
discussion of emergence. It is this focus that allowed Korn to reduce all emergence to
scaled hierarchies distinguished by downward constraint. It has also supported other
reductionism in the social sciences, such as structure to agency or vice versa, or “the
issues of physicalism, eliminative materialism, reductionism, supervenience, and so
forth” in philosophy of mind.107
However, there is also “diachronic emergence … [which] is the creation of new
patterns and thresholds in a system.”108 Diachronic emergence explains how wholes can
maintain their identity even though their parts change. For example, while new players
for the Toronto Blue Jays are always emerging and receding, the team itself remains.109
This position helps to explain what has been said about emergent wholes not being closed
totalities.
The final form of emergence according to Protevi is transverse emergence. This
form comes in four varieties.110 What are important are not the details of each form, but
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1. Homeostratic synchronic transversal emergence:
a. organic (symbiosis among organisms; ecosystems among groups of
organisms)
b. social (institutions forming a larger entity: colleges forming a university)
c. technical (e.g., computers and routers forming the Internet).
2. Homeostratic diachronic transversal emergence:
a. organic (symbiogenesis: Margulis' theory of the origin of the eukaryotic cell)
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the general explanatory power of transverse emergence. It captures nuanced forms of
emergence important to the thesis. 1. Emergence of things from the interaction of parts
that are necessary for the thing to be what it is e.g. a colony emerging from ants. 2.
Emergence of something from something else or what Protevi calls ‘system change’ e.g.
the change of American democratic politics from something exclusively for white males
to something ostensibly for any registered citizen. 3. Emergence of things from the
interaction of social, biological, and technical parts, this form would seem to broadly
capture most of the human world, for instance, all that has emerged from the assemblage
of human-horse-saddle, or human-symbols-media being assembled with various social
wholes. 4. The emergence of novel virtual problems. These nuanced forms of
emergence are of interest insofar as they are the types of emergence most important to
explain how the ethical can develop out of the natural and the social. The ethical
emerges as a distinct region of experimental solutions to the problems of social life,
which in turn develop out of the problems posed for human being by its situation in
nature.
What is important is that our freedom and our unity is difference. In every
encounter there is the problem of maintaining identity in the face of a challenge to it.
b. social (system change: change of the university from education of elite into a
centre for mass vocational training / military-industrial research)
c. technical (system change: from ARPANET to Internet to world wide web)
3. Heterostratic synchronic transversal emergence: (a bio-social-technical assemblage)
4. Heterostratic diachronic transversal emergence: (mutation and co-evolution of such
assemblages in 'machinic phyla'). (Protevi, DGE, 32)
“'machinic phyla’ ... [are] groups of assemblages defined by their affects: what they can do and
what they can undergo.” (Protevi, DGE, 32) In DeLandian terms, groups defined by their
capacities.
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Stable solutions are those that depend upon the maintenance of dynamic tensions between
the different elements of the encounter. An ethically legitimate solution depends not only
on stability, but on the genuine recognition of the value of the different approaches to
living that different people create as emergent solutions to the problems social and
natural context impose upon us. However, in order to fully grasp the ethical significance
of these ontological matters, we must turn our attention explicitly to the social realm.
The work of Margaret Archer –while not unproblematic, as we will see, establishes the
bridge between natural and social emergences that the argument needs to establish its
ethical conclusions.

Archer

In what follows I will not present a comprehensive analysis of Archer, as her
work is not the subject of the thesis. I am using quotations from Being Human to
establish a connection between the general ontological theory of DeLanda and the social
theory and ethics of Russon. 111 While Archer is highly valuable in this regard, it is also
the case that her understanding of emergence suffers in some regards in relation to
DeLanda. Thus, while I am using Archer’s work, I am not using it uncritically.
Archer and DeLanda are in agreement concerning some of the problems facing
social theory. They both highlight the dangers of micro and macro reductionism,
although she uses the terms ‘upward’ and ‘downward’ conflation, or ‘Modernity’s Man’
and ‘Society’s Being.’ Contra either form of reductionism, both she and DeLanda
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essentially argue that parts and wholes mutually interact in feedback loops within and
across scales. But whereas DeLanda does not draw any essential distinction between
natural and social wholes, Archer concentrates on emergent properties peculiar to society:
In contradistinction to both 'Society's Being' and 'Modernity's Man', social realism introduces a
stratified view of 'the subject' whose different properties and powers (PEPs [personal emergent
properties]) emerge at each level. To anticipate, the four strata involved are the self, the person,
the agent and the actor. The latter two are undoubtedly our 'social selves' which emerge
respectively through our involuntary embroilment in society's distribution of resources and our
voluntary involvement in society's role-array. However, they are themselves dependent upon the
prior emergence of a continuous sense of self and are co-dependent with the emergence of
personal identity, which reflectively balances its social concerns with those embedded in the
natural and practical orders of reality.112

Archer thus provides the specific conceptual grounds I need to establish the ethical
conclusions that interest me. DeLanda demonstrates that nature is itself dynamic and
creative, Archer demonstrates the ways in which society enables the emergence of the
specifically human capacities for intentional action and creativity. Thus, while both
DeLanda and Archer support the idea that reality is scaled, Archer develops concepts
specific to the relevant scales of human social life: institutions, individual wholes, minds.
Like DeLanda, she uses a scaled reality to counter both macro and micro reductionist
claims. She concentrates upon the emergent properties (selves, consciousness, etc.,) that
explain how human beings—composed of natural elements—are nevertheless capable of
creating value and meaning in their lives. These capacities are unique properties and
powers (analogous to capacities and tendencies) of human beings that bridge the distance
between unconscious natural creative process and intentionally creative human action.
That which she argues with regard to the social is not incompatible with DeLanda’s
more general ontology. We can see the similarity between them in her attempt to
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privilege neither the micro (biology) nor macro (society) scales when understanding
individual human capacities:
The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as pregiven, nor as socially
appropriated, but rather these are emergent from our relations with our environment. As such, they
have relative autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify both of them.
In fact, the stratified view of humanity advocated here sees human beings as constituted by a
variety of strata. Each stratum is emergent from, but irreducible to, lower levels because all strata
possess their own sui generis properties and powers.113

As we can see, she argues the reduction is impossible because all levels of reality have
emergent properties peculiar to themselves. That which is crucial for Archer is mapping
the proper concepts onto the proper scale—natural concepts to natural reality, social to
social realities, and so on:
At any moment the CS [(Cultural System)] is the product of historical Socio-Cultural interaction,
but having emerged (emergence being a continuous process) then qua product, it has properties of
its own which influence discursive relations with S-C [(socio-cultural)] actors. In other words,
there are causal influences exerted by the CS on the S-C level.114

So individual activity is not absolutely free, but constrained, but not absolutely
determined, either. Human beings can respond creatively within the given natural and
social contexts in which they find themselves. This possibility of creative response, we
will see, is crucial to the possibility of an ethics of experimentation. Thus, the value of
Archer is that she enables the argument to bridge the divide between unintentional natural
systems and intentional human action.
At the same time, there is also a danger in the way Archer explains the
relationship between these layers of strata. It could be the case that her generalised
categories, the CS and the S-C, become reified. General categories, like essences, may
describe things, but they do not explain them, since they do not actually exist. At
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minimum, reified general categories do not adapt to the ever-changing reality they intend
to describe. All that describes and explains reality is reality, and so for us observation,
analysis, simulation, and experimentation with real populations of real things and the
immanent patterns of development they can isomorphically share. Reified general
categories dictate (top-down) the program of study, missing the process animated by
difference. They do not let the real tell its story.
While DeLanda’s general ontology lacks specifically social categories—which is
why we need to examine Archer’s work—it remains essential to the overall project
because of its concrete specificity and avoidance of attributing causal powers to general
categories. We cannot speak of ‘society’ or ‘culture’ or any terminological combination
of the two as real independent things. We can speak of actually existing social entities,
like a specific community, group, or state, study its history looking for the actual things
that interacted and how they interacted to catalyze and sustain its emergence. From the
study of these real processes we can diagram mechanisms of emergence that will help us
understand populations of entities, but only insofar as that population remains relatively
stable, until inevitable bifurcation.
These mechanisms may apply to populations of different things at different scales.
There are trans-scale and trans-population mechanisms (there is isomorphism and multirealisability), however, there are things unique to each population at each scale and so
unique patterns. 115 The previous patterns are there but there are new ones added to the
mix. There are also the differences in how given pattern actualises within nonorganic,
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organic, biological, and social materials. The important thing demonstrated by the
observation of real populations, real mathematical models of populations, and real
simulations of populations, as well as studies (including simulations) of human agency (a
property and power of humans as part of populations) is that there is robust isomorphism
between certain patterns generated by the interacting materials of all realms. In very
general terms, isomorphism is resemblance with respect to important (singular,
significant, relevant) degrees of freedom, animating gradients, attractors, and
bifurcations.
Archer sometimes seems to lose sight of the importance of interaction of all
elements and runs the risk of privileging a ‘continuous sense of self’ in her theory.
Consider the following: “Introspectively, we are all constantly aware of the main
property upon which this emergent process depends.”116 Regardless of the specific
emergent process the idea that there is a main property on which it depends is
problematic even if the study of the process is confined to one scale (recall bifurcations,
as events of emergence). In this case Archer is referring to the emergence of personal
identity. And the ‘main’ property on which this process depends is “that we live a rich
inner life: that we are in continuous communion with ourselves and that we engage in a
continual running commentary with the events going on around us.”117 This is perhaps
saying something she does not intend to say.
It can be argued that it is because humans are social that they have the capacity
for ‘inner life,’ and also that we are able to be social because we have an inner life. I
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contend it just is not important to give primacy to one or the other and there are definite
consequences to doing so. Giving primacy to one or the other, at least seems to leave the
door to reductionism and reification open.
Archer is fundamentally trying to give humans and social wholes their due
independence from each other, without denying their mutual dependence. Her goal is
clear from claims such as: “independent properties and powers have to be granted to both
'structures' and to 'agents'.”118 In the case under consideration, however, if ‘inner life’ is
the ‘main’ human property that the emergence of personal identity depends on, then
effectively everything that humans with personal identities are part of (everything that
emerges from the interaction of personal identities) depends on this property of personal
inner life, not on the capacity to interact. Do we interact with each other because we
have an inner life or have an inner life because we interact with each other (because we
are here to interact with each other and do)? Neither needs to be made primary, unless
one wants to introduce a reified ontological hierarchy, which Archer may want to: PEP’s,
CEP’s, and SEP’s. If anything is primary it is interaction and all that entails, but not
‘primary’, interaction is just the way of things insofar as things are different and in
contact.
Archer perhaps does not extend her conception of emergence far enough. One
can grant that even the structures and patterns, the scales, the most general conditions of
being human we can observe are as historical and contingent as individual humans. At
times, for instance speaking of “The structures into which we are born”119, she is arguably
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talking about something significantly similar the throwness Heidegger and others did.
But one can understand that even this experience, so fundamental to ‘being human’, can
be recognised as just as historically contingent as everything else. But what is gained by
this recognition? Openness to the possibility of transcending ‘being human’ as it has
contingently developed to be; it opens us to the possibility and value of experiment. It is
a stretch, given the effective reality of what Heidegger et al describe, but life may one
day come into, be introduced to, conscious of, and live reality unimaginably differently.
Some of the above critiques are merely semantic, directed at a certain
inconsistency in her use of language which makes it appear that contingency is being
subordinated to an overarching necessity. Nevertheless, the language is important if one
wants to promote a realist point of view that does justice to the complexity and creativity
of all scales and realms of reality. It is important to speak of real dynamics of real social
entities, not generalised categories like CS and S-C that are imposed as the structure of
necessary scales. While Archer may be talking about a pattern that really exists she
might be careful not to imply that scales themselves are any less historical and
contingent. Scales themselves are not real, populations of entities and processes are real
and can be differentiated by scale.
In elaborating a description of the dynamics of social reality that seems to lack a
commitment to real concrete entities and processes (real populations of variable
replicators being sorted by their situation, animated by differences, within a space of
possibilities) Archer offers us a description that could, however currently apt, become
obsolete or worse. DeLanda gives us descriptions, but more importantly a point of view
that is inherently adaptive and that produces inherently adaptive results by strictly
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observing the dynamics of real things (which includes computer simulations and
mathematical models), always keeping contingency, bifurcation, multi-realisability and
isomorphism in mind. When supplemented by Archer’s social categories, it provides the
needed ontological foundation for an ethics of experimentation.
Despite these criticisms, then, Archer’s Being Human supplies the understanding
of human social reality that links the general ontology of emergence and creative
complexity driven by difference to human intentional activity, and thus to the possibility
of an ethics of experimentation. By making her social ontology isomorphic with general
ontology of complexity, and by that model human agency emergent from being social,
she grounds the ethical action of human agents in the maintenance of the conditions of
their agency. The ethical action of human agents is grounded in the life-requirements of
their lives as social agents, in maintaining their social-life-requirements. What having a
general ontology of creative complexity driven by difference in the picture adds is the
recognition that our social life and it requirements emerge from and interact with our
physical life requirements, which emerge from the physical requirements of life as we
know it, which emerge from our physical environment. The inclusion of such an
ontology provides a detailed and concrete way of looking things at all scales, in their
dependence and their independence, grounding them in reality. It does not reduce life to
matter but raise matter to life, with the aim of expanding our ethics from ourselves and
our groups to equally include all that sustains us as that we emerge from and interact
with. In other words, it allows us to ground our ethics in material reality, of which the
social realm is an important part.
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Thus we can see that both Archer and DeLanda are promoting the position that
the way we live, however necessary and/or rationally conceived it may appear (at our
scale), has a history and an irreducible element of contingency to it. In other words, they
want us to recognise that our ways of life and the histories that identify them are
contingent and so the ways we live are, and remain, mutable. My only concern with
Archer is that she sometimes seems to lose sight of the importance of contingency and
falls back into formulaic accounts of social process.
In statements like the following: “as a human being sequentially becomes a self,
then a primary agent and has the possibility of next developing into a corporate agent and
finally into a personalised actor”120 we see the potentially problematic idea that the
development of a self is a ‘sequence’, but given that developing to the next stage in the
sequence in only ‘possible’, we also see another instance of the idea that human
development can be arrested. This result is contrary to her deeper connection with the
openness and creativity of neo-materialism, as indicated by the following quotation:
... [human’s] can re-design the social array of roles, such that the positions available to them are
ones in which they willingly invest themselves, and thus become the kinds of 'social selves' with
whom they can voluntarily identify.121

While this view of what a better world might be like does resonate with this
thesis, this is not the only type of discussion she offers concerning bettering the world.
One might choose just talking about emergence and its need for interacting variety, solely
encouraging the fostering and maintenance of difference and its interaction, out of which
new and better ways of life for more may emerge. Archer, like older historical
materialists, concentrates her politics on the ‘oppressed,’ their ‘situation,’ and the means
120

Archer, Being Human, 269

121

Archer, Being Human, 269.

85

86
of mobilizing them.122 This is of course important but perhaps not the only route to
change.
Alternatively, we can show how what we, and the social entities that emerge from
us, have been doing as social entities is inherently, at least initially (prior to development
becoming arrested at some fixed point), self-transcending toward greater selfidentification—which is not to say that we should just leave it to happen on its own. It is
to say that anyone who can be, and is aware of this, is aware that to engage its project
consciously is to animate betterment of and for oneself, and, of and for everyone, and
everything else.
The focus can be the encouragement of heterogeneity and interaction, arguing to
maintain both for their own sake, as intrinsic values of human life, rather than for change
out of pity for the down-trodden or rage about being down-trodden. The point is
encouraging positive change through positively constructing systematic alternatives. The
‘mobilised oppressed’ strategy has shown itself to be problematic, as has the mobilised
vanguard of the oppressed. And the pity from above strategy has shown itself to be of
questionable affect as a motivator of social change among those with resources—many of
whom are essentially good people who would rather not have their world ‘disrupted’, but
would gladly welcome reasonable sustained change whose ends they understand and are
able to experience as betterment for all, including, and importantly, for themselves.
Marx described how some are oppressed and everyone is alienated (and so in
some way oppressed). We do not need to re-write that which has already been written.
Instead, let us talk about ways to make life better for everyone. Let’s talk about ways to
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do it that do not involve one faction disrupting, overcoming, assimilating, or eradicating
another. Let’s talk about what is and has been better about the ways we are and how to
encourage it. Let’s experiment and see how one might live. I will now conclude the
argument by unpacking this conception of an ethics of experimentation.
The next chapter will look at Russon’s understanding of human socio-historical
development and the role emergent goals play in it. As we will see, for Russon, mutual
equal recognition is an emergent goal of human history. It provides the necessary social
basis for the ethics of experiment I defend.
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CHAPTER IV
EMERGENCE, SELF-TRANSCENDENCE, LIFE
Russon
DeLanda’s general ontology, supplemented by Archer’s social categories,
provides the ground from which Russon’s ethics of open possibility can grow. His social
world is one that is open to possibilities and experimentation, while still having a
significant ethical dimension. The previous three chapters laid out a case for the reality,
in all realms, being a place of possibility and experimentation. Assuming that reality is
as this ontology says, the only ethical question that is adequate to that reality is how
might one live? Russon has an answer to this question that is not limiting, that is open to
a creative, experimental response that reality as I interpret DeLanda’s ontology, makes
possible.
Below is Russon’s example of the emergence of the democratic political system
in Ancient Greece, both from historical and literary analysis. It is an example of
Russon’s use of a conception of emergence and his notion that humans and social wholes
are in an on-going process of development and self-transformation.
Ancient Greece offers a helpful case study of the pattern of development of such family life.
Athens, for example, was governed by a small number of long-established extended families each
of which sought to win pre-eminence in power over the others. It was here that our modern sense
of a specifically "political" life emerged, in the struggles by which Athens sought to establish a
system of social organisation that denied to the family the right to identify itself as the primary
social reality and to insist instead that the city—a social field built out of a variety of families—
had to be recognised as worthy of the primary allegiance of all of its citizens, and that the city
rather than the family would set the terms for legitimate and illegitimate action.123
[There was a need] ... for something beyond the family and its vendetta-logic to govern
human affairs, and the Oresteia ends with the emergence of a transfamilial council—the core of
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the idea of a "state"—that recognises a larger sphere of social relations where family ties are not
the ultimate ground for determining just action.124

As we can see, Russon does not infer political structure form a pre-existing essence, but
describes its historical emergence.
The same attention to historical emergence applies to his understanding of what is
most valuable in human life. For Russon, “[h]uman fulfillment is accomplished in the
establishing of a perspective governed by the norm of universality-as-sharedness.”125 But
this is a “universality that has only an immanent meaning”126 and the sharedness is
necessarily the interaction of difference, in that we are each an individual situated intersubjective body with its own singular set of familiarities.
The human as an embodied contact with a world beyond itself is always reaching
beyond itself into the world, is always, in a sense, self-transcending. “As bodies, we
contact a world beyond ourselves, and, through our engagement with that world, we are
drawn to develop beyond our original capacities.”127 “Experience, therefore, is not the
construction of a representation that is somehow internal to an independent sphere called
mind; experience is, rather, being outside myself in the world.”128 What we contact is
what and a degree of how we experience. The initial contact in this world and
introduction to the rest of it, for Russon, is the family.
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"The family" is the name for the enactment of this self-transformative process. A child is initiated
into the reality of intersubjective experience— the "how" of others—through a history of
particular dealings with particular others.129

The family is a human being’s initial familiar others, it is part of what a human first
contacts through its self-transcending process. The family’s members are the initial
example of who we are and what there is. The family is that which initiates the human
into the larger social world and so its own process of emergence, socialising humans, is
also a self-transcendence. Said differently, the process of the family, the interaction of its
parts, while sustaining the family also pushes the parts that sustain it away (to different
degrees and in different ways).
Russon’s analysis of these dynamics admittedly focuses on a family structure that
is arguably ‘western’. But this is simply a case of looking at a specific population and
describing the patterns that emerge without reference to a predetermined model or ideal
end, bearing in mind that this structure like all is contingent at some scale. “If we are to
be adequate empiricists, we must let our (rigorously enacted) observations specify the
terms and parameters of our theories, rather than holding description answerable to
theory.”130 DeLanda follows the same path, as evidenced by him only looking at concrete
(real) things and processes as the source of understanding.
Granting the contingency of the family, at the scale and space-time of humans as
long as we have known ourselves, Russon’s conception of the family as initially most
familiar others, remains consistent across populations of animal based social entities.
From that initial self-transcendence toward a family, virtually infinite paths might be
taken, but the process can be and is arrested differently and for different durations for
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different people. However, this self-transcendence could be maintained indefinitely. We
could consciously move toward a reality of maximising this capacity for the most people.
I contend that the ontology and the epistemology indicated by this thesis are compatible
with a move to this reality.

DeLanda+Russon

Where a reified ideal telos can arrest our development in various ways to varying
degrees because of the irreconcilability of the ideal/real dichotomy, an emergent telos
emerges from the real and propels us to develop the real. 131 Russon’s mutual equal
recognition (universality-as-sharedness) is submitted as the emergent telos that can
animate sustained human development of the real in novel and experimental ways.
DeLanda’s reality is one of creation animated by difference, of fluidity, where I
argue, humans need not have their development arrested by ideals imposed as necessary.
Having our development arrested, for Russon, places us in ‘neurotic postures’, or a state
of self-contradiction. Russon:
In studying this stance of our intersubjective contacting that is so familiar to us—the stance of the
"ego"—we will again be discerning the dynamic, self-transcending character of a stance that
typically takes itself to be static and settled. We will see how disparity between what it is and what
it takes itself to be is the source of significant problems in human life. In studying this posture we
will see why human life characteristically faces problems in its development—specifically, we
will understand how the development of our subject-object contact becomes a neurotic posture.132
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Essentially, if we take ourselves and others to be self-transcending rather than
static (separate/totalised/essential) we will be less neurotic. Russon’s critique of how we
think with reference to this, the prejudice of presence (which includes in here/out there,
mind/body, subject/object dichotomies or dualisms), resonates with the critique of the
dogmatic image of thought. 133 Holding on to these prejudices and dichotomies, among
other things, supports operating on one’s surroundings (including body) in a way that
does not recognise that this operating not only can but does affect oneself and others in
some way at some scale. Russon, speaking of the image of thought in question, with
reference to the human self, the body, the world, and how we think about it:
According to this narrative, the self (as we saw in our study of the prejudices of presence in
chapter 1) is a discrete individual, separate from a world of things and other individuals upon
which one passes judgment, and separate from one’s own embodiment, which is treated as a tool
or a vehicle that one "has" or "uses."134

The world is static, I am separate from that world out there, my body is part of that
separate out there, both are mine to do what with I will. People who follow this narrative
often devalue the out there and deal with it inadequately. The ‘other’ (including our
body) is something to operate on or pass judgment upon, rather than learn from,
experiment with, and teach. Out there is taken to be something that we are in a sense
entitled to but not responsible for or to. Or in other neurotic (arrested) cases it is taken
something to be feared or as something devoid of meaning and possibility.
Contra this problematic understanding of human existence and identity, we can
“...come to understand existence as simply the dynamic of embodiment within which the
two poles of self and other come to be defined, and out of which the substance of their
133
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development into complex self-identities grows.”135 It is a process of interacting
differences that self-identity (like all) emerges from.
What brings these ‘poles’ together into interaction, what capacity is immanent to
our initial condition, such that when actualised it opens a possibility space for the
emergence of an experimental self-identity? I argue that it is our capacity for selftranscendence within a society of mutually recognising selves that enables this creation.
Linking a general ontology of creative complexity to the social allows the above to be
more clearly understood, which allows it to be seen as the material foundation for an
ethics that supports open experimentation as human flourishing. Insofar as human
beings reach beyond themselves, there is interaction and so development. Human selftranscendence is unique to humans, but it emerges from the developmental processes of
nature whereby non-living material elements ‘transcended’ themselves through the
emergent properties of life to which their interaction gave rise. What is unique to human
self-transcendence is that we can think about ever new and experimental ways to
transcend what we do. A sunflower self-transcends to do what it does, but it cannot
transcend what it does and still be a sunflower. Beyond some basic doings like
socialising, eating, drinking, sheltering, and sleeping to adequate degrees (which can all
be done in highly variable ways), as well dying, there is nothing necessary that humans
do to be humans.136 We can live differently, a sunflower cannot. Sunflowers, like all
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life-forms, can evolve, but human beings can consciously do so in directions that they
themselves invent.

Human Experience/Emergence

Russon, like DeLanda, dissolves the ideal/real dichotomy, uses a bottom-up
approach and his philosophy resonates with the sciences of dynamics and complexity.137
For both, reality, like music, must also be experienced in its movement, not just frozen
and atomised. The following, in broad strokes, traces Russon’s approach and correlates it
with DeLanda’s.
Russon begins his approach to human experience ‘in its movement’ with (1) the
form of human experience, which consists in (1.a) interpretation or the effort to organise
and integrate all of the dimensions of our experience into a coherent whole, (1.b)
embodiment or the point where each of us is something specific (our individual mode of
contact, how we are open to and how we open to others and the rest of reality), and (1.c)
memory or the present explication of the significance implicit in the identities of objects
with which we are engaged, where how we engage relates to our past commitments.
Someone’s location in space-time emerges from their projects, which emerge from their
past as remembered and interpreted, and from what s/he is committed to. In the terms of
this thesis, Russon’s ‘forms’ of human experience are the parameters (degrees of
freedom) of the space of human possibilities that he has selected as important.
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The next phase is (2) the substance or stuff of human experience which consists
of (2.a) familiar others and (2.b) unfamiliar others (things we are and are not habituated
to) and (2.c) neurosis or holding contradictory beliefs that place us into neurotic
situations where our habits impede rather than enable. 138 For instance the situation that
emerges from believing in a democratic emancipatory project while postulating a static
(ideal) reality. This phase can be correlated with the intensive.
I thinking about the intensive as related to the social we can think of neurotic
postures mentioned in the previous section. They are literally, though not only, physical
postures we contort our bodies into, as well as involuntary and awkward behaviours,
including ways of walking, talking, and eating. Insofar as these are related to our beliefs
(expectations founded on memory) and how we make contact with reality, which is
related to how we interpret reality, neurotic postures are also more than merely our
physical postures. For Russon, the very notion of normalcy is the prevalent neurotic
posture among members of ‘western’ social wholes. However, it is important to note that
neuroses/habits acquired from contacting what and those that surround us, are initially
and for the most part how we are in the world. For DeLanda too, “[t]he main
territorialising process providing the assemblage [human identity] with a stable identity is
habitual repetition.”139 These processes of habituation (learning) have intensive
characteristics, given that they are interactions with difference (the unfamiliar)
proceeding toward familiarity. Like convection trying to move temperature differences

138

The term phase has been maintained because it lacks hierarchical connotation while it captures

that there is a development in passing from one phase to another. Phase transitions can go in any direction.
139

DeLanda, New Philosophy of Society, 50.

95

96
toward equilibrium. However like convection in the mantel or the atmosphere where
equilibrium is never reached because the difference is maintained by the core and the sun
respectively, humans are constantly bombarded with unfamiliarities and so the process of
learning (habituation) never needs to end. The familiar-unfamiliar gradient will never be
equalised, though it can be engaged more or less consciously and its process can be more
or less arrested.
Russon’s final phase (scale, strata) of complexity (order and novelty) in Human
Experience is (3) the process of experience or how one lives life, as immanent to and
emergent from its form and substance. For Russon, this process is not inhibitively
neurotic when it consists of learning qua therapy qua philosophy, that is, when it consists
of “bringing the multiple significance that is our experience into a situation of
coherence.”140 The successively more complex modes of experience we move through
each emerge from complex interactions within, between, and across the previous ones.
There is multi-scaled feedback and emergence.
At each phase Russon shows how the next more complex way of contacting
reality (being open to and experiencing reality) emerges from the previous, adding
another layer which then interacts with the previous layers. For instance, “The family is
thus both an autonomous form of inter-subjective experience and also an agent for
initiating the family members into the larger form of social experience.”141 The family is
emergent and not a closed totality; it is an assemblage that to varying degrees enables its
parts to enter other assemblages. When we are habituated to the complexities of being
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part of an assemblage (for instance a family) we can maintain that assemblage without
being limited to it, that is, we can enter into other more complex assemblages without
dissolving the prior one (though we might).
Russon conceptualises the process of habituation as how we develop into more
complex worlds. How, for instance, once we are habituated to driving a vehicle we are
then open to the world made possible by having the vehicle as a mode of making contact
with the world. Initially our attention is held by acquiring the habit. Another example is
how with each reading of a text more and different things can be understood. Another
example would be how with each editing of an essay familiarity with the essay allows
one to address things that would not have been caught previously. There is also how the
individual edits from one time through potentially catalyse other changes the next. Once
we are habituated or familiar we can add a new layer, our identity is changed.
Personal identity … may be deterritorialised not only by loss of stability but also by augmentation
of capacities [by self-transcending] … When a young child learns to swim or to ride a bicycle, for
example, a new world suddenly opens up for experience, filled with new impressions and ideas
[with unfamiliar to become familiar, opening other new unfamiliarities...].142

To articulate the development toward complexity through habituation another
way, we could say that initially we find our significance only in our needs. Consider a
new born. They are only an interpretation of their immediate contact with reality, with
their whole self they reach out for what they need to be content and comfortable, they are
nothing but what they need/want and having those needs satisfied. From the perspective
of our initial awareness of embodiment ‘I’ am all that matters, but through contact with
(openness to, self-transcendence toward, response-ability to) demands that ‘I’ do not
control, ‘I’ realise that ‘I’ am merely something that matters. And as ‘I’ become familiar
142
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(habituated) with this, ‘I’ am opened by and to these others. As we become familiar with
the complexities of our family we become open to those of larger social populations and
so on.
For Russon, “the development of human self-identity ... is the form of the inherent
goal of the human project of mutual, equal recognition”.143 In other words, the
development of a coherent and healthy human self-identity is the realisation of the project
of mutual equal recognition. This telos, taken up as a goal or not, shows itself to be
immanent to the process of human development qua human development and not given
from the outside, as an eternal idea towards which human history develops. As Russon
argues,
Our very nature is this propulsion towards being a person, equal to others as a representative of
what it is to be human. This means a political ideal of universal equality is immanent to our
nature; it equally means that an ideal of objectivity—knowing according to the perspective anyone
would adopt—is immanent to our nature. What we see in our analysis of ourselves as bodies,
however, is that this universality can never be an escape from specificity or from the perspectival
character of our identity, for this specificity is the sole context within which the ideal of
universality is meaningful. Universality in human life, then, whether in politics or in knowledge, is
not a pregiven perspective that we can adopt by leaving our perspectival roots. It is rather the everpresent norm, immanent to all our dealings, which precisely takes the form of a demand to
reconcile: political universality is realised as disparate cultures accomplishing a sharedness of
perspective; epistemological universality is realised jointly in the identification with that which we
seek to know (we saw this in habit, above) in a context of a social accomplishment of sharedness
of perspective.144

While it might sound as if Russon’s language presupposes something like
‘substance ontology,’ I argue he is not a proponent of such a position. The first move in
justifying my interpretation is to define the conception of ‘immanent’. ‘Immanent’, in
DeLanda’s sense, essentially means emergent from, or, could not be without that to
which it is inherent, but is not reducible to it. When something is immanent to
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something, a population, it emerges from the population simply because of what that
population is (its properties, capacities to-to be, and tendencies). Recall also that all
emergence involves the interaction of different things. It is not that universal equality
and objectivity ‘emanate’ from humans, it not that they are ‘the essence of the human
project’. Given humans as they are and the parts that compose them, from the interaction
involved in humans being humans, universal equal recognition emerges as the outcome
of their interactions and conflicts. Contrary to substance ontology, these emergent goals
or teloi do not entail a homogenisation, but openness to experiment and experiments. If
this driving goal were a simple one toward everyone being the same, we would be, for
instance, if this were the case the oppressed would not revolt. The goals of universalityas-sharedness are pursued through learning, not through narrowing by conforming to an
abstract ideal imposed from without. It is not about all of us being and knowing the
same, it is about us recognising difference, having it interact, and learning from it.
Wars can be seen as an example of recognition as it manifests under the ideal/real
dichotomy, while they are also exemplary of development fuelled by feedback, and selftranscendence. Given that, as Russon and other theorists of recognition have argued, an
important human drive is needing and wanting to be recognised by others as one
recognises oneself, or, “having our own measuring of significance measure up to the
standards of others.”145 In war, or in situations that spawn violence, there is a lack of
mutuality in the recognition of one group for another, if not each for the other. For
instance they might recognise each other equally as enemy but not mutually insofar as
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they do not recognise each other as they each recognise themselves and demand to be
recognised. Further, perhaps one or both cannot be mutually recognised because the way
they recognise themselves and want to be recognised inherently does not adequately
recognise others. Conflict can be seen to emerge from deficiencies of mutuality and
equality which are products of the self-contradiction (internal conflict) that arises from
not being recognised by others in the way one recognises one’s self or vice versa. Instead
we can try to recognise others as they recognise themselves and try to be in a way that
others can recognise, which is inherently a way that recognises others (where others is
not only humans but everything). In other words, we can maximise our capacity to
recognise and be recognised, and they are facets of the same thing, to genuinely do one is
always to do both.
DeLanda points out that conflict, as a form of feedback, and an intense one at that,
has driven much development by forming auto-catalytic loops e.g. like those formed by
arms races between predator and prey in biological evolution, or those between warring
European nations throughout much of the last millennium. 146 It is the difference between
the interacting components that leads to novel combinations and novel emergences. But,
for humans, this difference can be mutually and equally recognised and so does not have
to manifest as violence. We can have interaction of difference and development that is
just as (probably more) intense than it is with violent conflict if we consciously and
openly engage difference, interaction, and development.
For both thinkers, development entails interaction and interaction entails
difference. The self transcends itself in order to be itself, which entails interacting with
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others (difference) and from this the social entity ‘family’ emerges. The family too, as
part of sustaining itself as what it is, transcends itself by initiating the members whose
development it harbours into larger social scales, who then transcend themselves,
catalyzing the emergence and maintenance of other things at other scales.
Russon’s bottom-up approach to who we are, and DeLanda’s bottom-up approach
to what there is, both dissolve dichotomies and explain things through processes of
emergence. DeLanda’s bottom-up approach has provided an ontological basis from
which to understand Russon’s bottom-up approach.
This section will end by broadly correlating 1000yrs and Human Experience. In
1000yrs DeLanda begins with what he calls (1) geological history, which deals with the
“dynamical elements (energy flow, nonlinear causality) that we have [without metaphor]
in common with rocks and mountains and other nonliving historical structures.”147 That
is, how all things, in the same way as rocks are “nothing but accumulations of materials
shaped and hardened by history”148—the form or parameters of reality. In Russon’s case
he is not talking about all of reality but only human reality. Nonetheless he begins his
journey up with the ‘form’ or parameters. Next is (2) biological history, that is, how
things interact and lead to the emergence of entities like species, food chains, families,
interpersonal networks, and groups. For Russon, the substance or stuff of our reality, that
is the intensive. Through discussing the evolution of species and the dynamics genes
DeLanda shows that while there are patterns shared between the physical and the
biological, there those that are unique to the biological. Last is (3) linguistic history, that
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is, how relatively simple social entities interact and other more complex social entities
like organisations, governments, anti-markets and nation-states emerge from the feedback
facilitated by language—For Russon the process of our reality is at its most complex at
the scale of responsible human agency as a property and power of human linguistic
society. More generally the process of reality refers to how novelty and organisation
emerge from interacting populations. But also DeLanda’s linguistic history is the history
of language as viewed through intensive, population, and topological thinking. And is an
example of a realm where many of the patterns from the physical and biological can be
found to exist along with patterns unique to the material that is human languages.
We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the telos submitted by this thesis.

Mutual Equal Recognition

Talk of an emergent telos is not talk about secret forces or positive thinking as a
causal force in some mystical sense. Nothing happens because of a force, a god, or
‘positive thinking’. The argument concerns the real creative potential of material
assemblages as a result of their own real natures. That is not to say that these creative
potentials are as fantastic as those we can imagine, it is to say that they are more
incredible, inspiring and unimaginable, because they are real.149 In a real way, if you can
‘think positive’ and ‘feel better’ and so engage the world in a more active, adaptive and
resilient way, barring anomalies like biohazards or getting hit by a bus, your life will go
149
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better. Put differently, if you are out there trying when opportunities emerge you are able
to engage them. If you recognise in a more mutual and equal way, on the whole, more
will probably come back to you. It is about creating a pattern not necessarily getting the
better of each individual interaction.
This pattern of recognition could be described as forming an autocatalytic loop, a
self-sustaining gradient (recognitionlack of recognitionrecognition, or,
familiarunfamiliarfamiliar; the more that is recognised the more there is to
recognise; the more you know, the more there is to know), that animates the genuine
development of individual humans, social wholes and their sustaining substrata.
Insofar as we emerge from the interaction of wholes that precede us and given
that we exist alongside some of these others, the self-sustaining gradient of recognition
can be seen to animate human development. Ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny
recapitulating cosmogony, where what is shared is the self-sustaining universal
singularity of recognition (interaction of difference). Generalising and skipping many
phases: Oxygen and hydrogen ‘recognise’ each otheramino acids and proteins
‘recognise’ each otherbuilding humans that can really, self-consciously recognise each
otherand then collectively recognise the Universe as their ultimate origin—all is the
Universe recognising itself, the form of recognition always developing.
At human social scales, the levelling of classes, and the constitutional
establishment of ‘rights’ are examples of development animated by recognition, but
neither is an end in itself, nor will there ever be an end; there will always be more to be
mutually equally recognisant of and more ways to be so.
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A further example of development animated by mutual equal recognition is the
development of what could be called our environmental consciousness. Historically,
humans have been (and are) largely unaware or ignorant of their effect on the planet.
This is the case even if they have relatively low impact on their surrounding environment,
which tends to be due to low population and low intensity ways of living, or even if they
have some mystical and/or ritualised sense of interconnectedness with and so some kind
of respect for ‘the environment’. The ignorance amounts to humans not seeing things at
enough spatio-temporal scales. Generally, humans did (and still do) not recognise their
environments and Earth as equally evolving entities we are a part of, and if they did it
was not to a degree adequate to actually understanding the mechanisms connection and
affect beyond its mere fact. Humans did (many still do) not recognise their surrounding
environs and Earth as that which recognises them by composing their reality as the sole
sustaining substrata (so far, and for a long while yet) of our existence—again this need
not only be recognised mystically and artistically, it also needs to be recognised
scientifically, empirically and philosophically. Our consciousness-awarenessintentionality-recognisance is developing and we are becoming more aware of our effect
on the planet (we can think bigger; take more into account). We can look at things in
terms of larger more detailed historical accounts, we can think in terms of different
entities, we can think in terms of things at different spatial scales (like atoms, us,
communities, nation-states, planets, and beyond) and we can think in terms of the
different life spans and rates of development (temporal scales) that these entities have and
exist at (like geological time, human time, evolutionary time and cosmic time).
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Along with the development of this consciousness there has been correlative
physical, technological and cultural development, for example, blue box trucks and
recycling infrastructure, consumer LED light products, solar panels, wind turbines,
documentary film, live oration, and TV commercials about environmental issues and
awareness. None of these are final solutions, they are attempts or experiments, they are
solutions to a well-posed problem. But we might wonder, along with Protevi,
Has global warming pushed us already into a crisis, modelled by a zone of sensitivity in which a
minor fluctuation that otherwise would not have budged us off our attractor, but merely moved us
to another point on that attractor, will now push us into another attractor, the ice age attractor, that
is, into a new climate pattern? Or will the global system create a new pattern, neither temperate
nor ice age, but something different? The global climate system might be creative and resilient,
but there's no guarantee the new pattern will provide a viable environment for human beings!150

And as a result, reassess the methods and intensity with which we are engaging how we
might live in interaction with the environment.
To recapitulate the key points: the ways we have lived have been experiments,
they have been developments driven by our drive for mutual equal recognition.
However, for the dogmatic image of thought, the successive life styles that have emerged
were each in their turn seen to be part of a necessary progression toward an ideal
homogenous and universal life style. Effectively, our development is arrested to varying
degrees for durations of time, until the next inevitable bifurcation, which changes us, but
is then taken and made to be a necessary step in a necessary progression.
To assume that we can figure out a final answer to how we should live is to
assume we know what the future holds i.e. that the world is static, or at least wholly
linear and so technically perfectly predictable. If we make conscious that nothing is
static, that the subject and the object are not dichotomously divided (not oppositionally
hierarchised) but part of dynamic tensions or gradients. If we consciously engage
150
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development within fluid reality driven by mutual equal recognition, who knows how one
might live? What we can know is that there will be as many experiments (answers), as
there are lives, if society permits this sort of creativity. As Russon argues,
…the society that is universally open to the human condition must be one that accepts this
necessity of social diversity as its premise. The “universal” society, then, is one that
acknowledges the experiential primacy of cultural pluralism—of narrative pluralism—and sees the
universality of a shared human environment as something to be achieved through learning to make
such narratives communicate rather than as a given, already existent situation of human
equality.151

As we are, humans navigate by becoming familiar with their surroundings (all
biological life does this in a certain sense). This being the case, each human is a singular
assemblage of familiarities; we are each individuated singularities with our own
memories, habits, and narratives. And so, our condition is immanent pluralism, even if
only because we each view the world from different eyes. Moreover, “our very
familiarity with the human world propels us into relations with strangers,”152 recall how
becoming familiar with riding a bike opens us to (propels us into) a world of new
(strange) experiences, or how the family propels us into other social wholes.
I am as strange to you as you are to me, and we are to they, and they are to we,
since we each have our own familiar sphere. There can be as much or as little difference
between two bankers as there is between one of those bankers and an escort. If
difference is mutually equally recognised who knows what novel ways of living might
emerge from the virtually infinite novel combinations of different components; who
knows what capacities might be actualised? Not that there are not better and worse ways
of living. If your way encourages the maximising of the capacities of others your

151

Russon, Human Experience, 72.

152

Russon, Human Experience, 73.

106

107
capacities will be maximised. The only prescription is allowing the capacities of others
to be maximised and trying to maximise one’s own which is trying to maximise
everybody’s.
When we are not and, more importantly, do not recognise each other, our
development is arrested; when we do not recognise ourselves as we are, obscuring what
we might be, because of imposed ideals our capacity to and our capacity to be recognised
is diminished. “We are our possibilities for interactions with things, and things are their
possibilities for our interaction.”153 Limiting our interaction limits our development and
thus also the possibilities for our capacities to be actualised.
The emergent goal (property, capacity, and tendency) of mutual equal
recognition includes seeking to recognise yourself as you really, rather than ideally, are.
This does not refer to finding an eternal essential self, or perpetuating the ways you have
been and are. To try to see one’s self in its reality is part of the continual process of
transcending that self. To be familiar with how one actually lives is to be opened to what
is beyond that way of living. All this serves to support open experiments in how one
might live.
If people were mutually equally recognised, not merely ignorantly tolerated with
reference to their degree of deviation from an ideal, they may not feel the need/desire to
engage in, for instance, abusive behaviour. Similarly, someone (who has the choice)
might not feel the need to individuate themselves by choosing to dress inadequately for
their climate (even when they have the option); they would dress adequately and reap the
benefits. In all situations there are types of clothing and ways of wearing clothing that
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facilitate and encourage connection and interaction with the environment and so further
develops recognition of the environment and the other humans that are part of it. If you
are comfortable you are more open to recognising and being recognised by what
surrounds you. This protection of our flesh is actually a maximisation of our flesh, it
increases the things that can be contacted and the ways things can be contacted. Also, it
leaves our flesh supple and sensitive and so more open to experience, experimentation
and observation in situations where protection is not needed. The more supple our senses
the more we can recognise, the more intimate our contact with what surrounds us, the
more solutions to how one might live we can create, the less our development is arrested.
The project of mutual equal recognition, for Russon, describes and explains how
and why humans move through increasingly complex modes of making contact with
reality. Human beings move themselves from crawling, to walking, to running, from
babbling, to talking, to formulating arguments, spoken and then through other mediums.
Mutual equal recognition can explain and describe how and why we develop. Given the
continuum of matter-energy-information-thought that we are part of, as mentioned, I
argue that mutual equal recognition is an emergent telos of the known universe of matterenergy-information-thought: We are part of the open assemblage of n assemblages
developing its recognition of itself.
As much as human behaviour in a given situation is an expression of our
interpretation of the demands the situation makes on us as significant, so is the behaviour
of an other an expression of their interpretation of the demands a situation makes on them
as significant. This is what needs to be mutually equally recognised for us to freely and
openly engage asking the question of how one might live. Insofar as we are each other’s
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examples and confirmation we have a responsibility to each other; we are response-able.
The degree to which this response-ability is engaged correlates with the degree to which
development is arrested for and by one.
…in the case of the larger society, just as in the case of the family and the case of the body, we can
see that the determinate form that one’s given situation takes will set the limits to the resources
that the situation offers for inhibiting or enabling one’s development, one’s self-transcending
activity of contact.154

Mutual equal recognition as an explicit goal, that is, fully actualising our immanent
response-ability as a goal, opens us to confident experimentation; it drives us to ask how
one might live with mutual equal recognition as an explicit goal.
To be a body, a subject-object, is to be a being of possibility, a being open to the emergence of
determinateness from a horizon of indeterminacy. The hand is a determinacy ... [that makes]
grasping possible—it is that by which I can grasp—and as such it is a route that opens us to a
multitude of as yet unimagined experience.155

Given this determinate openness, the multitude of possible experiences, and the relational
character of capacities to affect and be affected i.e. reality as it is and our selftranscending character, we can only ask how might one live?
I contend that all philosophy, religion, science, and art, further, that everything
humans do, to varying degrees manifests and expresses (1) what there is, (2) how it came
be, (3) why it is the way it is, and (4) prescribes a way of living. In most of his work,
DeLanda tries not to explicitly address (4), doing his Deleuzean best to merely pose the
problem well. I guess through it all we remain a degree Marxian, holding to the eleventh
thesis on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world ...; the point is, to
change, it.”156 So, we have made some prescriptions, but really they amount to
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prescribing that the individual choose to take on the project of prescribing (designing)
their own life, given the virtual parameters of reality and the actual parameters (material
conditions) individual to them. As just indicated, a goal of this project, then, is also
minimising the human created actual parameters that limit capacities to actively engage
in critical self-transformation. Let’s not limit each other, let try to limit the limitations on
each other. Let the virtual pose the problems, free the actual, which frees the virtual,
which frees the actual, which frees...

How Might One Live?

As I have argued, seeing the world as static and determined from without by an
ideal telos has led us to ask how we should live and moreover to impose answers to his
question as necessary. In contrast, genuinely engaging fluid reality projecting toward
mutual equal recognition opens us to asking “how might one live?” and its virtually
infinite imaginable and unimaginable possibilities. According to May “how might one
live?” is the question central to Deleuze’s philosophy.
It’s an odd question, in some sense; a question we don’t ask ourselves very often. We get up in
the morning, we brush our teeth, we crawl into our clothing, and we burn our days as though it
were impossible to live any other way, as though this particular life were the only one to be lived.
As though the universe were so constructed that it required our lives to unfold in this way and in
no other.157… It is a difficult question, a frightening one. There is much in us that rebels against
confronting it, taking it into our lives and creating ourselves in light of the freedom it offers. It is
simpler just to brush our teeth, crawl into our clothing, and burn our days than to ask what we
might become.158
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The Star Trek159 franchise can be seen as an engagement with thought
experiments in how one might live. Each species encountered, each new technological or
sociological development that emerges leads the characters to explicitly explore how they
might live considering what has been encountered and what is emerging from the
interaction. Each encounter is taken by the lead characters as an opportunity (if possible)
to develop a genuine relation of learning, helping, and teaching.
I reference Star Trek because I know it better than I know Shakespeare or some
other respected/time tested reference. And because I have learned a lot from it, and
believe others might too. There are things to be gained, as there are from any and all
interactions. Not that some things do not take too much in giving what they give. Some
things currently end apparent human life. Besides those that kill you, there is something
to be gained from any situation, even if the situation is an overall loss. Not to make light
in any way or to imply that he would not trade what he got for never having had the
experience, but Primo Levi gained insights into humanity, himself, war, life and death,
through his time in Auschwitz, and he wrote a book about it.160 You can scan the scales
of your experience and find the remarkable, interesting, and important. You can by some
measure try to improve your toilet cleaning method each time. Life can be lived by
developing the habit to improve and learn from any and every situation. The point is not
to hierarchise, but to grow, develop, try new things, and expand your self and its
capacities.
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Humans are determined to be self-determined; material reality has determined us
to be able to creatively change material reality. Through learning
(experimenting/exploring) we become more self-determined within the effectively
infinite range of what might be done given reality. Though determined we are free
insofar as the layers of determination are infinite and so also our journey of learning. But
this is not just a simple journey of discovering what is always already there. What we
think of as always already there has not always already been there, at a large enough
scale everything flows. All life-styles, in the broadest and most detailed sense, are
contingent actualisations of human capacities given particular contingent conditions. We
cannot perfectly predict/control life-styles by controlling conditions but we can to the
degrees we can alter ourselves and our conditions and experiment with how one might
live. This can be done in an ethically responsible way with reference to the real material
(physical and social) life-requirements of human beings.
With each passing moment we are in a novel reality. Although we are often
unaware of this, we can get into the habit of making ourselves aware of it by learning to
think at other scales. Everything is a spatio-temporal historical development and we can
affect these developments in varying ways and to vary degrees correlative to our degree
of understanding. Regarding understanding, if reality is nonlinear and ontologically flat,
if there is feedback within and across scales, if difference is the animator, and if
replication is variable, there can be no permanent prescription for how we or anything
should live. The only questions are how have things been? And how might they be?
Genuine development embraces the unending nature of development and the
difference that animates it. Genuine development encourages adaptability and resilience,
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and the emergence of the most (quality and quantity) for the longest (quality and
quantity). Genuine development thrives on heterogeneity. If we flee from a life of
genuine development, we are sentenced to self-contradiction and arrested development in
the name of homogeneity (equilibrium161). This sentence would remain a problem even
if that homogeneity is marketed as ‘diversity’, ‘equality’, ‘multi-culturalism’,
‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.
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“Nonequilibrium brings order out of chaos” (Prigogine & Stengers, Order out of Chaos, 286).

Without difference there is homogeneous randomness. A contained body of water that is turbulent due to
temperature differences has order, a contained body of water with no differences and no motion being
produced by the influence of an outside source of energy, has no order, it is random, its molecules move
this way and that without rhyme or reason; there is no difference, nothing changes.
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